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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON RAPE TRAUMA
SYNDROME
I. INTRODUCTION
Rape trauma syndrome is the label attached to the post-trau-
matic stress disorder experienced by rape victims.1 As such, rape
trauma syndrome encompasses the emotional, behavioral, and psy-
chological reactions common to victims of sexual assault.2 Expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome is introduced in both civil and
criminal trials. In civil actions,3 the plaintiff may introduce expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome to help jurors assess damages. 4
I The label "rape trauma syndrome" was coined by Ann Burgess and Linda Holm-
strom in their article Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 986 (1974).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 15-40.
3 A rape victim may bring an action in tort against the rapist for compensatory and
punitive damages. Though historically such civil actions were rare, several commenta-
tors recently have suggested that civil suits against rapists are a viable means of educat-
ing rapists about the gravity of their offenses and punishing those rapists who escape
punishment under the criminal justice system. See LeGrand & Leonard, Civil Suits for
Sexual Assault: Compensating Rape Victims, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 479 (1979); Comment,
The Civil Action for Rape: A Viable Alternative for the Rape Victim?, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 399.
In addition, several state statutes allow rape victims to receive monetary compensa-
tion from the state. Remuneration by a state is conditioned upon the victim demon-
strating before a court that she meets the statutory eligibility requirements. See, e.g., CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 13959.1 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84 (1977);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258A (West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B (West
Supp. 1978).
4 For example, in Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 436 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), a woman raped by a work-release inmate sued the Florida Department of
Corrections for damages arising from the rape. The -district court upheld the trial
court's admission of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. The plaintiff intro-
duced expert testimony to explain to the jury the nature and extent of the damages that
she sustained.
Other courts also have recognized the existence of rape trauma syndrome and its
relevance in civil suits to determining damage awards for rape victims. In White v. Vio-
lent Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1978), the New Jersey
Supreme Court demonstrated sensitivity towards the continuing emotional damage ex-
perienced by rape victims despite the healing of the physical injury-in this case, a bro-
ken jaw.
The court stated that:
[it cannot be realistically contended that the residual physical and psychologi-
cal effects of her traumatic experience were miraculously dissipated by the mere
removal of the wiring from her jaw. . . . Moreover, it has been observed that a
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The testimony educates jurors on "the nature of the trauma suffered
by a rape victim." 5 In criminal rape trials,6 the prosecution may in-
troduce evidence about rape trauma syndrome to corroborate the
complainant's assertion that she did not consent to intercourse. 7
frequent component of the 'rape trauma syndrome' rather consistently encountered
in rape victims is a so-called 'global fear of everyone' which is often marked by
withdrawal from social relationships in reaction to that most dehumanizing of all
crimes. [cites omitted] We do not doubt that the totality of these factors effectively
incapacitated plaintiff from normal social functioning for an extensive period of
time.
White, 76 NJ. at 387-88, 388 A.2d at 215-16. See also Alphonso v. Charity Hospital of
Louisiana, 413 So. 2d 982 (La. Ct. App. 1982)(woman who was raped twice while in
custody of defendant hospital was awarded damages for suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder and rape trauma syndrome).
5 Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So. 2d (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Terrio
v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983), for example, expert
testimony "to the general effect that medical science recognized a rape trauma syn-
drome and that certain kinds of conduct would be consistent with that syndrome" was
introduced in a civil action for assault and battery.
In a civil action for damages brought under U.S.C. § 1983 by a prison inmate who
had been raped by another inmate, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony to describe
the psychological and emotional disturbances experienced by the rape victim and to
establish that these disturbances were caused by the rape. Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
6 Use of rape trauma syndrome testimony in criminal actions is not limited to rape
cases, however. In a first degree murder case, for example, the defense introduced testi-
mony about rape trauma syndrome to establish that the defendant, a woman suffering
from rape trauma syndrome, was incapable of forming the mental state necessary for
malice aforethought. People v. Mathews, 91 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1979). See also State v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985) (use of
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome by defense to explain inconsistencies in de-
fendant's testimony); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084,475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1984) (testi-
mony intended to explain rape complainant's inconsistent behavior).
7 Consent has various roles in statutory definitions of rape. Several states include
lack of consent as an element of the crime. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1982);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982).
Several other state statutes, without explicitly mentioning consent as an element of
the crime, require the prosecution in rape cases to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the victim did not consent to intercourse. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-70 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 767 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-4-1 (Bums 1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265,
§ 22 (West supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 1983); OHiO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02 (Baldwin 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-302 (1977).
In a third approach, Michigan has enacted a statute that does not mention consent
as an element of rape and does not require consent to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt as an element of the crime. See MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520(a)-(1) (West
Supp. 1982). Though the Michigan statute does not expressly authorize an affirmative
defense of consent, Michigan courts have interpreted the statute to allow such a defense.
See People v. Hearn, 100 Mich. App. 749, 755, 300 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1980); People v.
Kahn, 80 Mich. App. 605, 619 n.5, 264 N.W.2d 360, 366-67 n.5 (1978).
At least one state has proposed legislation making lack of consent an affirmative
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This Comment focuses upon the use of expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome in rape trials where consent is at issue.
The admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
to show lack of consent in rape trials is controversial. Though sev-
eral state courts admit such testimony,8 three state supreme courts
have rejected the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome. The California, 9 Missouri, 10 and Minnesota" Supreme
Courts held that rape trauma syndrome testimony was inadmissi-
ble.12 The Missouri and Minnesota Courts stated that the evidence
would not help the jury to decide whether intercourse was consen-
sual but would, instead, mislead the jury and unfairly prejudice the
defendant.' 3 The California Supreme Court concluded that rape
trauma syndrome is not a scientifically reliable method for proving
that a rape occurred. 14
Contrary to these state supreme courts, this Comment con-
cludes that rape trauma syndrome testimony is admissible evidence.
The Comment first examines the medical and scientific foundation
of rape trauma syndrome. Next, the Comment examines the re-
quirements for admissible evidence in general and for admissible
expert testimony in particular, and analyzes the admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome testimony under these requirements. This Com-
ment argues that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome meets
the criteria for admissible expert testimony and thus should be ad-
missible in rape cases to help prove lack of consent.
defense. See P.A. 1067, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass. (1983). See generally Comment, Rape Reform and
a Statutory Consent Defense, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518 (1983).
Rape trauma syndrome testimony, thus, would most often be introduced by the
prosecution to help establish that the complainant did not consent to intercourse when
lack of consent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In certain states, rape
trauma syndrome testimony also can be used by the prosecution to rebut the affirmative
defense of consent raised by the defendant.
8 State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. 270, 674 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Mc-
Quillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d
1292 (1982); State v. Liddell, - Mont. -., 685 P.2d 918 (1984); People v. Reid, 123
Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1984); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475
N.E.2d 486 (1984); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978).
9 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
10 State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
11 State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227
(Minn. 1982).
12 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland also has held that expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome is inadmissible. Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664
(1985).
13 State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); State v. McGee, 324 N.W. 2d 232
(Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
14 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d. 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
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A. MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION OF
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
Mental health professionals1 5 agree that rape is a stressful situa-
tion that may have an immediate and disruptive impact on a victim's
emotional and psychological state.16 Rape trauma syndrome is the
label attached to the acute stress reaction experienced by rape vic-
tims. 17 The syndrome describes the behavioral, physical, and psy-
chological reactions of rape victims.' 8 Though mental health
professionals recognize that individual reactions to rape may vary
according to the victim's age, 19 access to supportive friends or rela-
tives,20 ability to cope with disruptive events,2 1 and the circum-
stances of the rape,2 2 the professionals have observed patterns of
15 The Comment uses the phrase "mental health professionals" to describe the med-
ical doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, and sociologists who have conducted
studies on the psychological, emotional, and behavioral consequences of rape.
16 Rape is described as a crisis situation. As such, it has been likened to other stress-
ful, potentially life-threatening situations such as wars, surgical procedures, and commu-
nity disasters. See E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM 33 (1976); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR,
UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 230 (1979);
NADELSON & NoTmAN, Emotional Repercussions of Rape, MeD. ASPECTS HUM. SEXUAI=TY, at
16 (March 1977); Shrier, Rape-Myths, Misconceptions, Facts and Interventions, 78 J. Med.
Soc'y N.J. 668, 669 (1981).
17 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982; Ellis, Atkeson & K. Calhoun, An Assess-
ment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 263, 263 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Ellis, Long-Term Reaction]; Nadelson & Notman, Emotional Repercussions of
Rape, supra note 16, at 19.
18 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982.
19 Older women may recover from rape more slowly than younger women. They
may harbor traditional notions about rape and a victim's responsibility for the rape.
They may be less resilient, or they may receive less support from friends and relatives.
Atkeson, Calhoun, Resick & Ellis, Victims of Rape: Repeated Assessment of Depressive Symp-
toms, 50 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 96, 101 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Atkeson, Victims of Rape]; Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 983; Nadelson &
Notman, supra note 16, at 16.
20 Women who have strong social support networks are more likely to recover faster
than those without such networks. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 983. See also E.
HILBERMAN, supra note 16, at 33; Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 101; Nadelson
& Notman, supra note 16, at 16.
21 In their study Lfe Change and Rape Impact, 21J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAv. 248 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Ruch, Life Change], Ruch, Chandler and Harter found a connection
between a woman's ability to adapt to changes of life such as marriage, divorce, career
change, death, or geographical relocation, and a woman's response to rape. The study
found that "women experiencing a high level of change in their lives will suffer higher
levels of rape impact than those with more stable lives. An explanation for this pre-
dicted relationship is that prior stress increases the vulnerability of the individual and so
makes coping with the added trauma of a sexual attack more problematic. By implica-
tion, women experiencing less prior stress may have more resources to cope with a rape
and recover more quickly." Id. See also Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 101.
22 The degree of violence involved in the rape and the relationship between the vic-
tim and the rapist may affect the victim's reaction. A victim who is related to or
acquainted with her attacker may be more severely damaged psychologically by the rape
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response in rape victims. They have identified these patterns as the
rape trauma syndrome.
Two early studies by Sutherland and Scherl 23 and by Burgess
and Holmstrom 24 described the stages of response and recovery
that rape victims experience. Although Sutherland and Scherl di-
vided victims' reactions into three phases25 whereas Burgess and
Holmstrom described only a two phase reaction,26 the two studies
provide consistent descriptions of the behavioral patterns and psy-
chological responses characteristic of rape victims. Both studies
emphasize the wide range of emotional and physical reactions that a
rape may produce. 27 Rape victims may display feelings of fear, an-
ger, shock, and anxiety in an overt, hysterical fashion immediately
following the attack,28 or may appear stable, calm, or subdued.29 As
than a victim whose attacker is a stranger. Nadelson & Notman, supra note 16, at 16, 23.
See also Queen's Bench Foundation, Rape Victimization Study State of California, Office
of Criminal Justice (June 1975); A study by Frank, Turner and Stewart found that wo-
men who were assaulted with a weapon were more easily able to readjust to their imme-
diate family setting following the rape than those who were not assaulted with a weapon.
And those who had been assaulted previously were less able to readjust socially than
those who were assaulted for the first time. Resick, Calhoun, Atkeson & Ellis, Social Ad-
justment in Victims of Sexual Assault, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 705, 706
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Resick, Social Adjustment].
23 See Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 Am.J. ORTo-
PSYCHIATRY 503 (1970).
24 See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1.
25 According to Sutherland and Scherl, the first phase-the victim's acute reaction-
occurs immediately after the rape and may last for a few days or a few weeks. A victim's
acute reaction "may take a variety of forms including shock, disbelief, and dismay," and
may result in agitated, incoherent or highly volatile behavior. Sutherland & Scherl, supra
note 23. Extreme anxiety may follow shock and dismay, as the victim must confront
problems such as notifying parents, deciding whether to press charges, and facing
friends. The second phase of a victim's reaction, that of "pseudoadjustment," occurs
when a victim outwardly resolves the traumatic effects of rape by returning to her regu-
lar lifestyle, which may include work or school activities. During this second phase, a
rape victim typically denies or suppresses feelings of anger or resentment in the interest
of returning to ordinary daily life. Id. The final phase of integration and resolution
"begins when the victim develops an inner sense of depression and of the need to talk.
It is during this period that the resolution of the feelings aroused by the rape usually
occurs." Id. at 504-07.
26 According to Burgess and Holmstrom:
[t]he first [phase] is the acute phase. This is the period in which there is a great deal
of disorganization in the woman's lifestyle as a result of the rape. Physical symptoms
are especially noticeable, and one prominent feeling noted is fear. The second
phase begins when the woman begins to reorganize her lifestyle. Although the time
of onset varies from victim to victim, the second phase often begins about two to
three weeks after the attack. Motor activity changes and nightmares and phobias
are especially likely during this phase.
Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982.
27 Id. at 982, 983; Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23, at 504, 505.
28 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982; Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23, at
504.
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they begin to deal with the aftereffects of rape, victims may feel
afraid, humiliated, and embarrassed, as well as angry, vengeful, and
blameworthy.30 During the first few weeks following the rape, vic-
tims also experience a variety of somatic reactions including physi-
cal trauma,3 1 skeletal muscle tension,3 2 gastrointestinal irritability,33
and genitourinary disturbance.3 4
These early studies also described the long-term process of re-
covery that follows a rape.3 5 During the period of recovery, a victim
typically resolves her feelings about the rape by accepting the event,
appraising realistically her complicity in the rape, and expressing
her anger toward the rapist.3 6 Disruptive events, such as residence
changes,3 7 upsetting dreams, and nightmares frequently accompany
this period.38 As a defensive reaction to the traumatic circum-
stances of the rape, victims also develop phobias3 9 including fear of
sexual relations, fear of crowds, fear of being alone, fear of people,
fear of the indoors or fear of the outdoors. 40
In recent studies of rape victims' reactions, researchers have
criticized the methodology used in the early studies by Burgess and
Holmstrom and by Sutherland and Scherl.4 1 These researchers
29 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982; S. Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23,
at 504-08.
30 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 983; Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23, at
507.
31 "Physical trauma" is defined broadly as including "general soreness and bruising
from the physical attack in various parts of the body such as the throat, neck, breasts,
thighs, legs and arms." Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982.
32 "Skeletal muscle tension" includes symptoms such as tension headaches, fatigue,
sleep pattern disturbances, and startled reactions over minor incidents. Id.
33 "Gastrointestinal irritability" includes stomach pains, appetite disorders, and nau-
sea. Id.
34 "Genitourinary disturbances" include gynecological symptoms such as vaginal dis-
charge, itching, generalized pain, and vaginal infection. Id. at 982, 983.
35 The studies describe the long-term recovery process as a period of "reorganiza-
tion." Id at 983; Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23, at 508.
36 Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 23, at 508.
37 Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 983.
38 Women experienced two types of dreams. In one type, women were in frightening
situations and wished to do something to change the situation, but woke up before act-
ing. In the other type, women were able to master the situation and fight off the assail-
ant. Id. at 984.
39 Id.
40 Id. Women who were attacked indoors while sleeping developed fear of the in-
doors. Those who were attacked outside of their homes developed fear of the outdoors.
Id.
41 See, e.g., Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empirical Find-
ings, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHAuTRY 658, 658 (1979) [hereinafted cited as Kilpatrick, After-
math of Rape]; Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 705. These researchers also have
criticized the methodology used in the following studies about rape trauma syndrome:
McCombie, Characteristics of Rape Victims Seen in Crisis Situations, 46 Soc. WoRK 137 (1976);
1371
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have pointed out that the early studies did not compare the reac-
tions of victims to the reactions of a control group of nonvictims,
nor did they use "standardized, reliable instruments for measuring
responses to rape." 42 The researchers also expressed concern that
the sample of victims in the early studies were selected improperly
or described poorly.43
Despite one researcher's assertion that the early studies "pro-
vide little, if any, scientifically valid data regarding the effects of a
rape experience, '44 the results of recent, methodologically sound,45
Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Consideration, 133 Am. J. PsYcnHiARY
408 (1976); Peters, Social, Legal, and Psychological Effects of Rape on the Victim, 78 PA. MED.
34 (1975); Queen's Bench Foundation, Rape Victimization Study, supra note 22. See, e.g.,
Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, at 658.
42 Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 4 1, at 658. See also Resick, Social Adjustment,
supra note 22, at 705. The early studies relied on interviews with rape victims for gather-
ing information. The information collected from rape victims was never compared with
information from a control group of women who had not been raped to determine
whether victims' levels of fear, anxiety, or depression were higher than those of non-
victims.
43 See, e.g., Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 658.
44 Id. at 659.
45 In the recent studies, the researchers collected information not only during inter-
views with the victims but also through self-administered, standardized questionnaires.
See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 96, 97 (a structured interview as well as the
Beck Depression Inventory-a pencil-and-paper questionnaire-were used to measure
the depressive symptoms of rape victims); Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note 17, at 263
(participants were given the Beck Depression Inventory, the Profile of Mood States, the
short-form of the Pleasant Events Schedule, and the Modified Fear Survey; participants
were also given a semi-structured interview); Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41,
at 661 (victims' and nonvictims' anxiety, fear, mood states, and psychological distress
were measured by standardized tests); Norris & Feldman-Summers, Factors Related to the
Psychological Impacts of Rape on the Victim, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 562 (1981) (vic-
tims were required to fill out a self-administered questionnaire) [hereinafter cited as
Norris, Psychological Impacts]; Resick, Social Adjustment, supra note 22, at 706 (victims and
nonvictims completed the Social Adjustment Scale-Self Report to measure their imme-
diate and long-term social adjustment).
The researchers also compared information collected from rape victims with infor-
mation collected from a control group of women who had not been raped. See Atkeson,
Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 96, 97 (the women in the victim group were rape victims
who had visited a hospital rape crisis center; the nonvictims were women recruited from
social services agencies, public housing projects, and the YWCA; the control group ap-
proximated the victim group in terms of age, race and socioeconomic background);
Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note 17, at 263 (the victims were recruited for the study
through newspaper ads, rape crisis center counselors, or public speaking by the research
staff; a matched group of nonvictims was recruited through the YWCA and human ser-
vice agencies); Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 660 (victims were women
who had sought counseling at a rape crisis center; the nonvictim group was chosen from
among women living in the victims' neighborhoods and matching the victims' ages and
races); Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 706; (victims were selected from among
rape victims seen at a hospital rape crisis center; the control group was recruited from
social service agencies, housing projects, and the YWCA).
Furthermore, the researchers collected information at regular intervals following
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empirical research reinforce the findings of the early studies. The
recent studies conclude, as did the early studies, that rape has an
immediate, profoundly disruptive effect on the victim's emotional
and psychological state.46 The recent studies confirm that during
the period immediately following the rape, victims commonly expe-
rience fear, anxiety, and depression. Sleep and eating disturbances,
guilt, shame, irritability, fatigue and decreased libido are some char-
acteristics of victims' depression.47 Recent findings also support
earlier findings that victims typically begin to recompose themselves
and return to normal levels of functioning between two to six
months after the rape.48
In addition, the recent studies empirically support the early re-
searchers' conclusion that rape produces long-term psychological
consequences for victims. 49 According to recent studies, rape vic-
tims continue to experience "nervousness, tension and trembling,
.. .panic attacks, feelings of terror, feelings of apprehension and
dread, and some somatic correlates of anxiety" for a long time fol-
lowing the rape.50 A year following the rape, victims "are more de-
pressed, get lesser enjoyment from their daily lives, report being
more tense and fatigued and report more interpersonal
problems" 51 than women who have not been raped.5 2
the rape. See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 96, 97 (victims and members of
the nonvictim control group were assessed at six intervals after the rape); Kilpatrick,
Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 660, 661 (victims and nonvictims were assessed at
four points following the rape); Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 706 (the victim
and control group were assessed six times following the assault).
46 Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 667. See also Resick, Social Adjustment,
supra note 22, at 710-11 (victims' social adjustment-work life, leisure activities, and
relationships with friends and family-disrupted); Ruch, Life Change, supra note 21, at
248.
47 Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 96.
48 See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 100 (depressive symptoms in rape
victims diminished to normal levels within two and four months); Kilpatrick, Aftermath of
Rape, supra note 41, at 664 (after three months, victims' distress eased substantially);
Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 705 (victims' social adjustment improved to the
levels reported by nonvictims).
49 See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 101; Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra
note 17, at 264-66; Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 668; Norris, Psychological
Impacts, supra note 45, at 562; Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 710, 711 (victims'
social adjustment at work continued at an impaired level relative to nonvictims); Ruch,
Life Change, supra note 21, at 248.
50 Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra note 41, at 668. See also Atkeson, Victims of Rape,
supra note 19, at 101 (a number of victims continue to have depressive symptoms 12
months after the rapes); Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note 17, at 264-66 (victims were
more depressed and got less enjoyment out of daily activities than did nonvictims);
Resick, SocialAdjustment, supra note 22, at 710-I1 (victims' ability to function at work and
to adjust socially remain impaired up to eight months following the rape).
51 "Interpersonal problems" include difficulties communicating and relating to
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Mental health professionals studying the physical, emotional,
and psychological consequences of rape agree that rape is a trau-
matic event and that rape victims experience a wide variety of reac-
tions.53 Researchers do not purport to be able to predict with
precision which of the many features of rape trauma will be exper-
ienced by an individual rape victim. But they have collected reliable
information on victim reactions and have identified patterns of re-
sponse. Although this research has not focused on developing a
method for distinguishing an actual rape victim from a person with a
falsified complaint of rape,54 a mental health professional who is fa-
miliar with the findings of rape trauma research and who has experi-
ence treating and counselling rape victims should be able to discuss
accurately the nature and variety of responses of rape victims. The
professional also could identify in a rape complainant the character-
istic symptoms of rape victims, in whatever form they may be.
B. DISAGREEMENT AS TO ADMISSIBILITY
State courts disagree over whether expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome is admissible in criminal rape cases to show that
the victim did not consent to intercourse. State courts in Mon-
tana,55 Kansas,56 Oregon,57 Ohio,58 and New York59 have held that
friends and family. See Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note 17, at 264; Resick, Social
Adjustment, supra note 22, at 711.
52 Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note 17, at 266.
53 See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 96; Ellis, Long-Term Reaction, supra note
17, at 263; Norris, Psychological Impacts, supra note 45, at 562; Resick, Social Adjustment,
supra note 22, at 705; Ruch, Life Change, supra note 21, at 248.
54 See Atkeson, Victims of Rape, supra note 19, at 101; Kilpatrick, Aftermath of Rape, supra
note 41, at 658, 668; Norris, Psychological Impacts, supra note 45, at 566-67.
55 In State v. Liddell, - Mont. -, 685 P.2d 910 (1984), the Montana Supreme Court
upheld the admission of testimony by a psychiatric nurse about rape trauma syndrome.
The prosecution offered the testimony in a rape trial to assist the jury in determining
whether the complainant consented to intercourse.
56 In State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982), the Supreme Court of
Kansas upheld the admission of a psychiatrist's testimony on rape trauma syndrome
during a rape prosecution where the complainant's consent was at issue. A board certi-
fied psychiatrist who had examined the victim two weeks after the rape, testified about
post-traumatic stress disorders, and rape trauma syndrome in particular. The psychia-
trist gave his opinion that the victim suffered from the post-traumatic stress disorder
known as rape trauma syndrome.
57 In State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 441, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978), the Oregon Court of
Appeals upheld the admission of testimony about rape trauma syndrome at a rape trial
where the complainant's consent was at issue.
58 An Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the admission of expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome at a rape trial. State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475 N.E.2d
486 (1984).
59 In People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1984), a New York
supreme court granted the prosecution's pre-trial motion requesting permission to in-
1374 [Vol. 75
1984] TESTIMONY ON RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 1375
this testimony is admissible in such cases. These courts found testi-
mony about rape trauma syndrome to be probative on the issue of
consent, and they were satisfied that the experts who testified were
qualified to provide helpful information on rape trauma syndrome
to thejury. The Supreme Courts of California, Minnesota, and Mis-
souri, however, have found that such testimony would not help the
jury to determine whether the complainant consented to intercourse
and, therefore, have held that such testimony is not admissible. 60
troduce expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. The prosecution planned to intro-
duce the testimony in a rape trial to explain that the complainant's inconsistent behavior
was attributable to the rape trauma syndrome.
60 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984);
State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.
1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
In People v. Bledsoe, the California Supreme Court overturned the superior court's
and court of appeals' decision that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome was ad-
missible. The prosecution had offered testimony by a licensed marriage, family, and
child counselor to show that the victim suffered from rape trauma crisis syndrome. The
California Supreme Court objected to the use of the testimony as a means of proving
that a rape had occurred. The court ruled that the syndrome is not a scientifically relia-
ble means of proving that a rape occurred. 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 460.
In State v. Saldana, the trial court had admitted testimony by a counselor for sexual
assault victims about rape trauma syndrome. The prosecution offered the testimony to
rebut the defendant's contention that intercourse was consensual. In addition to testify-
ing about the emotional and psychological stages that a rape victim typically undergoes,
the expert described the complainant's reaction. The expert concluded that the com-
plainant had been raped and had not fantasized the incident.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the counselor's testimony regarding rape
trauma syndrome should have been excluded for two reasons. First, the testimony could
not help decide the consent issue. Second, the testimony produced an extreme danger
of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231.
In State v. McGee, decided the same day as Saldana, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the trial court's admission of expert testimony regarding rape trauma syn-
drome was reversible error. The testimony in McGee was offered by the prosecution to
show that. intercourse was not consensual. The testimony in McGee, unlike the testimony
in Saldana, did not include the expert's conclusion that the victim had been raped. In-
stead the expert physician simply described rape trauma syndrome and stated his opin-
ion that the victim's behavior subsequent to the incident was consistent with rape
trauma syndrome. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Taylor, rejected the admissibility of an ex-
pert's testimony that the prosecutrix suffered from rape trauma syndrome. - The court
stated that an expert may testify that the prosecutrix exhibits and possesses "the charac-
teristics consistent with those resulting from a traumatic stress reaction, such as rape."
663 S.W.2d at 240. The court held, however, that an expert's conclusion that the victim
suffered from rape trauma syndrome improperly bolstered the victim's credibility and
unnecessarily tampered with the jurors' decision process. Id. at 240-41.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has also held that expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome was inadmissible to prove that the rape complainant did not consent
to intercourse. Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 3d 503, 516, 487 A.2d 664, 670 (1985).
The court agreed with the prosecution that such testimony was relevant and material to
the issue of whether a rape occurred. The court, however, held the testimony to be
COMMENTS
The division among states over the admissibility of expert testimony
on rape trauma syndrome stems from disagreement about the
qualifications of the expert witness, 6 1 the relevance of such testi-
mony in establishing that intercourse was not consensual, 62 the sci-
entific community's general acceptance of rape trauma syndrome,63
and the helpfulness of such testimony to the jury.64
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON RAPE TRAUMA
SYNDROME AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
This Comment examines the admissibility of expert testimony
on rape trauma syndrome under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Although rape prosecutions typically are subject to state rules of evi-
dence, many states have adopted the Federal Rules, 65 and the
requirements of other state rules are similar to those of the Federal
Rules. To be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, ex-
inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact on the defense and because it unduly cor-
roborated the victim's testimony. Id.
61 See People v. Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 261, 681 P.2d 302, 307, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461,
466 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653-54, 647 P.2d at 1299; State v. McGee, 324
N.W.2d at 234 (Wahl, J., dissenting); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229, 232; State v.
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 235, 236; Statev. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. at 415-16, 587 P.2d at 1047.
62 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460;
Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. at 514, 487 A.2d at 669 (testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome is relevant and material to issue of whether rape occurred); State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d at 230 (testimony about other victims' reactions not helpful to deciding issue of
consent in this case); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 247, 475 N.E.2d at 488 (testi-
mony clearly relevant and material to alleged rape).
63 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (rape
trauma syndrome is not a generally accepted method of proving that a rape occurred);
State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299 (rape trauma syndrome is generally
accepted to be a common reaction to sexual assault); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233
& n.1 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (concludes that substantial data base supports the existence
of rape trauma syndrome); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230 (rape trauma syndrome is
not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has
occurred); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240 (literature supports testimony that rape
trauma syndrome is generally accepted as a reaction to rape); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d
1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 241 (citing scientific support for the rape trauma syndrome).
64 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460
(jurors are as capable as an expert to consider evidence and decide whether rape oc-
curred); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 234 (Wahl, J., dissenting)(testimony on rape
trauma syndrome is probative on the issue of consent and is thus helpful to jury); State v.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230, 231; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241 (testimony about
rape trauma syndrome is inimicable to the operation of the jury system); People v. Reid,
123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 241 (rape and victims' reactions are not within com-
mon knowledge ofjurors); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 247, 475 N.E.2d at 488
("[e]xpert opinion is necessary to properly interpret the reactions [of rape victims]").
65 Twenty-six states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in some form:
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, South Dakoa, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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pert testimony on rape trauma syndrome must satisfy the require-
ments of three rules: the requirement of Rule 402 that the
testimony be relevant; the requirement of Rule 403 that the proba-
tive value of the testimony not be substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice; and the requirements of Rule 702 that
the testimony be given by a qualified expert and that it be a proper
subject for expert testimony. This Comment concludes that expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome satisfies the requirements of
these rules. The testimony, therefore, should be admissible in rape
cases where the complainant's consent is at issue.
A. RELEVANCE REQUIREMENT
Expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome first must
meet the relevance requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 402,
which provides that only relevant evidence is admissible.66 Relevant
evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." 67 The trial court has the discretion to decide
whether evidence is relevant.68
Expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome generally is
offered by the prosecution to establish that the complainant did not
consent to intercourse with the defendant. 69 To be admissible,
66 Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Consti-
tution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
67 FED. R. EVID. 401. See also United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d 1337, 1342 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1981)(relevance is established by any showing, however slight, which makes it more
likely than it was before the admission of evidence that the defendant committed the
crime in question); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("The
basic relevancy test is whether proffered evidence has a tendency to make the existence
of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without benefit of the evidence");
United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
McCormick describes a similar test for relevance: "whether the evidence offered renders
the inference desired by the offering party more probable than it would be without the
evidence." C. MCCORMICK, § 185 at 437 (2d ed. 1972).
68 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) states, "[p]reliminary questions concerning the
.. .admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... See also Goff v.
Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1982).
69 See, e.g., State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. 270, 674 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1983); People
v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State v.
McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d
1292 (1982); Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 514, 487 A.2d 664, 669 (1985); State v.
McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229
(Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); State v. Liddell, - Mont. -,
685 P.2d 918 (1984); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488
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expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome must make the
inference that the complainant did not consent to intercourse and
thus was raped, more probable than it would be without the expert
testimony. As will be shown, expert testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome supports such an inference.
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is probative on the
issue of consent for two reasons. First, rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony provides information on an individual victim's emotional and
psychological response to the alleged rape. Second, the testimony
provides information on group behavior patterns in response to
similar events.
Expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome typically
covers two areas. First, the expert testifies about the characteristic
responses to rape experienced by rape victims. Second, the expert
describes the complainant's psychological and behavioral state after
the alleged rape. 70 In addition, the expert may offer an opinion as
to whether the complainant's symptoms are consistent with rape
trauma syndrome. 71 Some courts also have allowed the expert to
offer an opinion as to whether the complainant was raped72 or suf-
fers from rape trauma syndrome. 73 Thus, the expert's testimony
provides the trier of fact with information about the complainant's
emotional and psychological condition.
Testimony about a complainant's emotional and psychological
condition following the alleged rape tends to make the inference
that a rape occurred more probable or less probable than it would
be without the testimony. Courts have recognized repeatedly the
(1984); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978). For examples of other
uses of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome, see notes 4-6.
70 The expert's observations and conclusions about the victim's behavior and psy-
chological condition often are culled from counselling sessions with the victim or from
treating the victim. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Gal. 3d at 240-41, 681 P.2d at 293, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 452 (therapist counseled victim in three or four sessions within the month
before trial); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299 (psychiatrist examined
victim two weeks after the rape); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233 (Wahl, J., dissent-
ing)(physician examined victim immediately after incident and on two later occasions);
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (counselor met with complainant over a 10 week
period).
71 See, e.g., State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. at 272, 674 P.2d at 335; State v. McQuillen,
236 Kan. at 169-70, 689 P.2d at 829; State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653-54, 647 P.2d at
1299; State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 234 (Wahl, J., dissenting); State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d at 229; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240-41; State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. at 415,
587 P.2d at 1047.
72 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229. But
see State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 239-40.
73 See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 244, 681 P.2d at 296, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 455;
State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240; State v. Liddell, - Mont. at -, 685 P.2d at 922.
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relevance of the victim's emotional and psychological condition
after an alleged rape to the question of whether a rape actually oc-
curred.74 In Morgan v. State,75 for example, a relative with whom the
victim lived following the alleged rape provided "[e]vidence as to
the conduct, appearance, and reaction of the rape victim during a
period beginning two days after the alleged attack and continuing
for a period of approximately six weeks .... *76 The court held
that such evidence was relevant to the question of whether an attack
occurred. 77 Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the ad-
mission of testimony concerning a victim's inability to sleep imme-
diately following the alleged rape, a symptom of the rape trauma
syndrome.78 The court reasoned that such testimony was "of at
least some evidentiary value as tending to prove force and lack of
consent. . .. -79 Additionally, in cases where consent is at issue,
courts have accepted evidence regarding the victim's emotional
state following the alleged rape as partial corroboration of the vic-
tim's testimony that she was raped.80 Moreover, in cases in which
courts have permitted doctors to testify that intercourse was against
the will of the victim, the doctors considered the emotional
condition of the victim following the attack as one of the factors con-
tributing to their conclusion. 8'
74 Even jurisdictions that reject the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome accept testimony about the complainant's mental and emotional condition
following the alleged rape. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d 302, 203
Cal. Rptr. 461 (1984) (police officers and doctor testified about complainant's emo-
tional condition following alleged incident); State v. Booker, 384 N.W.2d 753 (Minn.
1984) (court admitted testimony about complainant's emotional condition following al-
leged rape); State v. Thompson, 668 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. App. 1984) (complainant testified
about psychological condition following rape); State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App.
1984) (court allows complainant's mother to testify about complainant's psychological
and mental state following alleged rape; allowing such testimony is consistent with the
Taylor decision barring use of testimony about rape trauma syndrome).
75 Morgan v. State, 229 Ga. 532, 192 S.E.2d 338 (1972). See also State v. Radjenovich,
138 Ariz. 270, 674 P.2d 333 (1983)(victim's marked personality change after her en-
counter with the defendant was relevant to the issue of consent in that it corroborated
the credibility of the victim).
76 Morgan v. State, 229 Ga. at 535, 192 S.E.2d at 341.
77 Id.
78 Toole v. State, 146 Ga. App. 305, 246 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
79 Id. at 308, 246 S.E.2d at 341.
80 See, e.g., Wallace v. United States, 362 A.2d 120 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976)(the victim's
appearance, behavior, and emotional state following the alleged rape, as well as her
prompt disclosure of the attack were sufficient to corroborate her testimony); Tucker v.
State, 243 Ga. 683, 256 S.E.2d 365 (1979)(the victim's testimony was partially corrobo-
rated by other witnesses who testified that the victim was upset and crying following the
alleged attack).
81 See, e.g., People v. LaPorte, 103 Mich. App. 444, 303 N.W.2d 222 (1981)(examin-
ing physician's expert opinion that there had been penetration against the will of the
1379
COMMENTS
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is relevant to the
issue of whether a rape occurred not only because it provides infor-
mation on an individual victim's emotional and psychological re-
sponse to the alleged rape, but also because it provides information
on group behavior patterns in response to similar events. 82 Courts
have recognized the relevance of testimony on the behavior patterns
and psychological characteristics of identifiable groups to the issue
of whether a particular individual was the victim of crime or the par-
ticipant in a crime. In State v. Cavallo,83 for example, a defendant
charged with rape sought to introduce psychiatric testimony com-
paring his psychological characteristics with those of the typical
rapist. The defense hoped to establish that the defendant did not
possess the psychological characteristics of a rapist.84 Although the
court ultimately held the testimony to be inadmissible, 85 the court
did hold that the testimony was relevant:8 6
[T]he fact that Cavallo has the character of a non-rapist is used to
draw the inference that he did not commit rape on this occasion. As-
suming the reliability of Dr. Kuris' [the psychiatrist] conclusions, his
testimony makes it more likely than otherwise that Cavallo did not
rape S.T. [the victim]. Consequently, the proffered evidence is
relevant. 87
The court's reasoning implies that a comparison between the char-
acter traits of the defendant and those of the group of people known
victim was based upon the physicial and emotional characteristics of the victim whom
physician had examined shortly after the alleged rape); People v. Wells, 102 Mich. App.
558, 302 N.W.2d 232 (1980)(doctor's testimony that this was a legitimate case of sexual
assault was based upon his physical findings in examining the victim, the history re-
ceived from the patient, the emotional condition of the patient, and his experience ex-
amining victims of alleged sexual assaults).
82 See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229.
83 88 NJ. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982).
84 Id. at 512, 443 A.2d at 1021-22. See also State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. 270, 674
P.2d 333 (1983)(prosecution offered testimony by a psychiatrist about the behavior of
rapists and the fact that the defendant's actions were consistent with acts of a "power
rapist").
85 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the admissibility of the evidence on the
following grounds: (1) the defense failed to establish that the scientific community gen-
erally accepts the existence of identifiable character traits of rapists; and (2) the defense
failed to show that psychiatrists are able to determine whether an individual is likely to
be a rapist. State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. at 526, 443 A.2d at 1029.
86 The New Jersey court applied Rule 1(2) of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.
"Rule 1(2) defines relevant evidence as 'evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove any material fact.' . . . [T]he test [for relevance] . . . is whether the evidence
'renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence."'
Id. at 516, 443 A.2d at 1023. Thus, the test for relevance under the New Jersey Rules of
Evidence is consistent with the test applied under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87 Id. at 515, 443 A.2d at 1024.
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to be rapists-if such traits can be accurately defined-is relevant to
the issue of whether the accused raped the complainant.
Courts also have admitted expert testimony to show the similar-
ities between an individual's physical and emotional characteristics
and those who suffer from battered wife syndrome, 8 familial child
sexual abuse syndrome,89  and battered child syndrome.9 0
88 See Ibn-Tamas v. United States I, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. App. 1979)(testimony of a
clinical psychologist offered by defense in a murder trial to describe the phenomenon of
"wife battering" and to give an opinion of the extent to which the defendant's personal-
ity and behavior were consistent with those of battered women held to be admissible to
help jury evaluate the validity of defendant's claim of self defense); Smith v. State, 247
Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (198 1) (testimony of a clinical psychologist describing the phe-
nomenon of "wife battering" and giving an opinion as to whether the defendant's per-
sonality and behavior were consistent with those of the battered women studied by the
psychologist was held to be admissible to help the jury evaluate the defendant's claim of
self-defense); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980)(testimony by domestic
violence expert offered by the prosecution to show that defendant's assault on his wife
was not produced by mental illness, but instead was consistent with the pattern of physi-
cal abuse in battered wife syndrome held to be admissible).
See also Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(trial court's
exclusion of expert testimony on battered wife syndrome was reversible error where
defendant raised claim of self-defense); Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334
(1981)(trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on battered wife syndrome was revers-
ible error where defendant raised claim of self-defense); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App.
3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983)(trial court's exclusion of testimony by psychologist and
psychiatrist on battered wife syndrome was reversible error); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892 (Me. 1981)(trial court's exclusion of testimony by psychologist about consistency of
defendant's conduct as a battered woman with claim of self-defense was reversible er-
ror).
Some courts, however, have held that expert testimony on battered wife syndrome
is inadmissible. On remand in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 895 (D.C.
App. 1983), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that evidence regarding
battered women syndrome was properly excluded because the syndrome lacked ade-
quate scientific documentation. See People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d
196 (1980)(testimony by doctor as to whether "battered women" tend to remain with
their mates was properly excluded); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518 (1981)(testi-
mony by a psychiatric social worker to support defendant's claim of self-defense was
properly excluded). Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981)(testimony by clinical
psychologist explaining discrepancies between the defendant's behavior and that of the
typical battered woman and expressing opinion that defendant shot her husband in self-
defense was properly excluded). See also Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to be
Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981); Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken:
Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1 (1982); Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiaty Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 348 (1982) [cited herein-
after as Comment, Battered Wife Syndrome]; Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential
Defense to a Homicide Charge, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213 (1978).
89 See, e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982)(testimony by child
psychiatrist stating that child-complainant's conduct and mental and emotional condi-
tions were similar to those of other child rape victims whom the psychiatrist had
interviewed was admissible); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984) (expert per-
mitted to testify about characteristics typically observed in sexually abused children and
about the characteristics of sexually abused children observed in complainant); State v.
Carlson, 360 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (testimony permitted as to whether
COMMENTS
Objections to testimony in these areas generally do not focus on
the relevance of information regarding the physical, behavioral,
emotional, and psychological characteristics of a group to the deter-
mination of the facts in an individual's case.91 In fact, courts accept
the testimony on group characteristics for its usefulness to the
factfinder in assessing the credibility of the victim or the defend-
ant.92 Similarly, an expert's testimony on the common reactions of
rape victims would provide a factual background against which the
factfinder could evaluate better the complainant's assertion that she
was raped.
children's behavior was consistent with sexual abuse); People v. Benjamin, 103 A.D.2d
663, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1984) (expert testimony permitted on sexual abuse in family
settings); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983)(testimony by social
workers-who were familiar with typical response of rape victims and children sexually
abused by their own family-that daughter's behavior was consistent with typical behav-
ior of sexually abused children, was admissible at trial where defendant was charged
with first degree rape of his daughter). But see State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395
(Minn. App. 1984) (expert testimony on familial sexual abuse syndrome held
inadmissible).
90 See, e.g., State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978)(testimony by
doctors stating that deceased child's bruises did not fit the pattern of bruises normally
sustained by children in day-to-day activities and giving opinion that deceased child was
a "battered child" was admissible in a trial were defendant was charged with second
degree murder of his two year old son). The court in State v. Wilkerson stated: "As far
as our research reveals, all courts which have considered the question, including our
own Court of Appeals, have concluded that such expert medical testimony concerning
the battered child syndrome as was offered in this case is properly admitted into evi-
dence." State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 570, 247 S.E.2d 905, 912 (1978) (citations
omitted).
91 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. App. 1983)(expert testi-
mony on battered wife syndrome properly is excluded until the court is convinced of the
sufficiency of the syndrome's scientific underpinnings); People v. White, 90 Il. App. 3d
1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980)(isolated testimony whether battered women tend to re-
main with their spouses was excluded for having no direct bearing on defendant's claim
of self-defense); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981)(expert testimony on bat-
tered wife syndrome properly was excluded where there was inadequate foundation to
show that this case involved a battered woman's self-defense claim and where there was
inadequate demonstration that the state of the study of the psychology of battered wo-
men permits a reasonable opinion to be given by an expert).
Though each of these cases excludes the expert's testimony about group character-
istics, each case either explicitly or implicitly recognizes that expert testimony on bat-
tered wife syndrome could be admissible when the facts of the case warrant the
testimony and when the scientific foundation of the testimony is adequately demon-
strated. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d at 895; People v. White, 90 Ii. App. 3d at
1072, 414 N.E.2d at 200; Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d at 1378. See also Comment, Battered
Wife Syndrome, supra note 88, at 355-61. But see, State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518
(1981)(testimony by a psychiatric social worker on battered wife syndrome would tend
to stereotype the defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced and to decide facts
based on typical facts rather than the actual facts of the case).
92 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States 1, 407 A.2d at 632; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. at 619,
277 S.E.2d at 683; State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii at 775-76, 645 P.2d at 1334; State v. Baker, 120
N.H. at 775-76, 424 A.2d at 173; State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1219-21.
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Though not all courts have found expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome to be admissible at rape trials,9 3 most courts that
have considered the relevance of testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome to the issue of consent have concluded that such testimony is
relevant. 94 In State v. Marks,95 for example, the Kansas Supreme
Court reasoned that "if the presence of rape trauma syndrome is
detectable and reliable as evidence that a forcible assault did take
place, it is relevant when a defendant argues the victim consented to
sexual intercourse. ' 9 6 Because the Kansas Supreme Court found
that rape trauma syndrome generally is accepted to be a common
reaction to sexual assault,97 the court concluded that testimony re-
garding the existence of rape trauma syndrome is relevant in a case
where the complainant's consent is at issue.98
Information about a complainant's psychological, behavioral,
and emotional state following the alleged rape bears directly on the
question of whether the complainant was a voluntary participant in a
sexual encounter or instead was raped. Accurate information on re-
actions to rape educates the jury and provides a factual foundation
upon which jurors can evaluate the evidence of the complainant's
psychological, behavioral, and emotional response to the alleged
rape. Together these two types of information make the inference
that the complainant was raped more probable or less probable than
it would be without the information. Rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony provides both of these types of information and is, therefore,
relevant to the issue of whether a rape occurred.
B. PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome, even though
relevant, may be excluded if its probative value99 is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 00 confusion of is-
93 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460;
Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. at 516, 487 A.2d at 670; State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233;
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
94 See State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. at 273, 674 P.2d at 336; State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at
654, 647 P.2d at 1299; Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. at 514, 487 A.2d at 669 (testimony
relevant but inadmissible because of prejudicial effect); State v. Liddell, - Mont. at -,
685 P.2d at 922-23; State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 247, 475 N.E.2d at 488.
95 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
96 Id. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 653-54, 647 P.2d at 1299-1300.
99 Probative value is the tendency of the evidence to prove any issue of consequence
to the case. P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 72 (1980).
100 The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 describes unfair
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sues, or misleading the jury.'0 1 Rule 403 provides for such an ex-
clusion 10 2 to promote correct factual determinations and fairness in
the judicial process by excluding evidence that may cause the case to
be decided on an improper basis. 10 3 Trial courts have broad discre-
tion in balancing the probative value of expert testimony with the
counterweights of prejudice, confusion, and tendency to mislead. 104
prejudice as an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one." McCormick provides a similar explanation.
It should be emphasized that prejudice, in this context, means more than simply
damage to the opponent's cause. A party's case is always damaged by evidence that
the facts are contrary to his contentions; but that cannot be ground for exclusion.
What is meant here is an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an
improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 185 at 439 n.3 1. See also United States v. Bailleaux, 685
F.2d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
101 Confusion of the issues or misleading the jury may occur when the admission of
evidence creates a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues of the
case. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 185 at 439; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 403 [04], at 403-36 (1982) [hereinafter cited as J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER]. Evidence may be excluded as misleading when it is seemingly plausible, per-
suasive, conclusive and significant, but would need detailed rebuttal evidence or compli-
cated judicial instructions to show the jury that the "evidence actually has little probative
value." J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER 403 [04] at 403-39. Courts may also exclude evi-
dence having an aura of scientific infallibility because the jury may be misled by the
evidence and be likely to attach undue weight to the evidence. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, T 403 [04] at 403-27. See also United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir.
1977) ("inherent danger that expert testimony admitted without proper foundation may
tend to confuse or mislead the trier of fact and thus, defeat a defendant's right to a fair
trial"); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972)) (trial court abused discretion in
admitting Government expert witnesses' testimony having dubious relevance and preju-
dicial impact); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (expert testi-
mony on voice spectrograms properly admitted where adequate safeguards taken
against misleading the jury).
102 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
103 United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
905 (1977). "Evidence that appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers mainsprings of human action may cause ajury
to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case. J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 403 [04], at 403-42 (1982). See also United
States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); FED.
R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note; Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Tech-
niques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 794
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Expert Testimony].
104 See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); United States v.
Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 796 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668, 670 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); Bridger v.
Union Railway Co., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966).
The trial court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly
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Yet appellate courts and commentators advise trial courts to apply
this rule sparingly and to admit relevant evidence where there is
doubt about the existence of countervailing factors.10 5
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome does not create
dangers of unfair prejudice 0 6 or confusion of the issues. l07 Evi-
dence that "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of
horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other main-
springs of human action"' 0 8 typically causes unfair prejudice. Ex-
pert testimony on rape trauma syndrome consists of a description of
the victim's emotional and psychological condition, as well as back-
ground information that places the description in context. It is a
professional's detached description of a victim's injuries and, there-
fore, has none of the inflammatory content that typifies unfairly
prejudicial evidence. 0 9 Moreover, the introduction of rape trauma
syndrome testimony does not place new issues before the jury. The
testimony is inferentially related to the main issue at hand-whether
the complainant consented to intercourse- 110 because it addresses
the emotional and psychological condition of the victim after the
alleged rape.
The counterweight to the probative value of expert testimony
on rape trauma syndrome is the danger of misleading the jury. In
erroneous. See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. at 31; Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99
U.S. 645 (1878); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152.
105 United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 656 U.S.
1008; United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d at 797; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
101, at 4037; P. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 99, at 72.2. Rothstein notes that there is a pre-
sumption in favor of admissibility in Rule 403. "[E]xclusion will not result if the
counterweights merely 'outweigh' probativeness-they must 'substantially outweigh.' In
addition, 'prejudice' is not enough-it must be 'unfair' prejudice." P. RoTHSTmIN, supra
note 99, at 72.2. Weinstein agrees that the Federal Rules favor admissibility. J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, at 403-7.
106 Unfair prejudice here refers exclusively to the undue tendency of evidence to sug-
gest a decision on an improper, typically an emotional, basis. See supra note 100. Some
courts refer to unfair prejudice as the cumulative effect of confusion, misleadingness, or
unfair prejudice. But see Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 3d at 514, 487 A.2d at 669 (expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome creates danger of unfair prejudice).
107 Confusion here refers exclusively to the tendency of evidence to suggest side
issues that distract the jury from the proper issue to be decided.
108 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 403[03] at 403-19 to 20.
109 See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979); Betancourt v.J.C. Penney Co., 554 F.2d 1206, 1207 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1977)(evidence
of violent visits by her alcoholic ex-husband admitted ostensibly to explain why plaintiff
did not seek medical care after accident had obvious potential to inspire sympathy and
cause inflated verdict); Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307 F.2d 757, 769 (2d Cir. 1962)(a refer-
ence to the dependent children of the plaintiff merely for inducing sympathy from the
jury is inadmissible); C. McCORMICK, supra note 67, § 185 at 439; P. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 99, at 72.4; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 403[03] at 403-20.
110 See supra notes 66-98 and accompanying text.
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criminal trials, expert or scientific evidence runs the risk of mislead-
ing the jury because of its " 'aura of special reliability and trustwor-
thiness.'"111 The commonly expressed fear is that jurors will be
overly impressed by an expert's credentials or by the scientific trap-
pings of the testimony. Jurors might, therefore, accept uncritically
the conclusions of the expert, or attach undue weight to the testi-
mony, despite weaknesses in the scientific foundation of such
testimony.112
The concerns about jurors' undue reliance on an expert's testi-
mony about rape trauma syndrome arise because such testimony de-
rives from the psychological sciences. 113 The psychological
sciences, unlike the biological sciences, observe, measure, and de-
scribe nothing but invisible derivatives of mental processes. Unlike
biological experimentation, psychological experimentation rarely
consists of rigorously controlled experiments. Rather, psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists rely on careful observations in partially con-
trolled situations for their experimental opportunities and rely on
themselves and their abilities to observe as the research instru-
ment. 114 Psychiatry and psychology are not considered exact sci-
ences. Thus, the fear that jurors will abdicate their factfinding duties
in favor of experts' testimony, where the bases for such testimony
are inexact, subjective, and evaluated only with difficulty by jurors,
applies to expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome.
Courts weighing the probative value of expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome against the danger of misleading the jury
have established two positions: (1) the probative value of expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome is always substantially out-
weighed by the danger of misleading the jury;"I5 and (2) the
probative value of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome must
be weighed with the danger of misleading the jury on a case-by-case
basis.116 Whereas the first approach mandates the exclusion of ex-
111 United States v. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268 (quoting United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d
1148, 1152 (1973). See also United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556; United States v. Bailer,
519 F.2d at 466.
112 See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556; United States v. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268
(quoting United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d at 466.
113 See supra notes 15-54 and accompanying text. In contrast to testimony from the
psychological sciences, courts accept routinely the value of expert testimony based on
the medical sciences. McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MER-
CER L. REV. 463, 475 (1977).
114 Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Specu-
lations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1965).
115 See State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
116 See State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982); State v. Mc-
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pert testimony on rape trauma syndrome,' 1 7 the second approach, a
case-by-case approach, admits the testimony under appropriate
circumstances. "18
The Minnesota Supreme Court struck a permanent balance
against the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome in State v. Saldana 1 9 and its companion case, State v. Mc-
Gee.120 In both cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the
testimony did not help the jury and produced an extreme danger of
unfair prejudice to the defendant.' 21 The testimony had no proba-
tive value because jurors are able to consider the question of
whether the complainant consented to intercourse without an ex-
pert's testimony and because evidence of characteristic responses of
rape victims does not help jurors to decide what happened in this
particular case. 122 Moreover, the court found that the danger of
misleading the jury counterbalanced any probative value of the
testimony:123
Permitting a person in the role of an expert to suggest that because
the complainant exhibits some of the symptoms of rape trauma syn-
drome, the complainant was therefore raped, unfairly prejudices the
appellant by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthi-
ness .... [The expert's] testimony "gave a stamp of scientific legiti-
macy to the truth of the complaining witness's factual testimony."' 124
Other courts, however, have adopted the case-by-case ap-
proach, balancing probative value against the danger of misleading
the jury.125 In State v. Marks,126 the Kansas Supreme Court struck
the balance in favor of admitting expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome. The only factor the court considered in measuring pro-
bative value was the relevance of the evidence. As a counterweight
to unfair prejudice, the court considered the availability of cross-
Gee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (Wahl,J., dissenting); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or.
App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978).
117 See State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
118 See State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299; State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at
233-34 (Wahl, J., dissenting); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. at 415-16, 587 P.2d at 1047.
119 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
120 324 N.W.2d 232 (MInn. 1982).
121 State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30.
122 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
123 Id. at 230-31. See also State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (inherent danger
of prejudice caused by witness' status as expert outweights probative value of
testimony).
124 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230-31 (quoting People v. Izzo, 90 Mich. App. 727,
730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
125 See State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653-54, 647 P.2d at 1299; State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d
at 233 (Wahl, J., dissenting); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. at 415, 587 P.2d at 1047.
126 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
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examination and the ability of the jury to weigh the credibility of the
testimony.1 27 As the courts that have adopted a case-by-case ap-
proach recognize, expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
should not be inadmissible under all circumstances. Indeed, as will
be shown, rape trauma syndrome testimony almost always should be
admissible. The danger of such testimony misleading the jury rarely
should outweigh the probative value of the testimony.
Courts that exclude rape trauma syndrome testimony on the
ground that it will mislead the jury do not appreciate the jury's rec-
ognized ability to evaluate testimony by mental health professionals.
Rape trauma testimony can be provided by physicians, 128 psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, 129 trained social workers, 30 and other mental
health professionals.13 ' Jurors frequently are required to evaluate
testimony given by these professionals in criminal trials. Mental
health professionals, particularly psychiatrists and psychologists,
testify in cases involving the defense of insanity,' 32 the defenses of
automatism and unconsciousness, 133 and the defense of diminished
capacity. 13 4 In rape trials, the defense may present psychiatric eval-
uations of the mental and emotional condition of the complainant to
127 Id. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299. The dissent in State v. McGee agreed that cross-
examination would prevent the expert testimony from becoming an 'unwarranted rein-
forcement of [complainant's] testimony' or from giving a 'stamp of scientific legitimacy
to the truth [of complainant's] factual testimony concerning the rape.' State v. McGee,
324 N.W.2d at 234 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
128 State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233 (Wahl, J., dissenting)(testimony by medical
doctor).
129 State v. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1298-99 (testimony by board certified
psychiatrist).
130 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (testimony by a counselor of sexual assault
victims); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. at 415-16, 587 P.2d at 1047 (testimony by "Rape
Victim Advocate" holding master's degree in social work).
'3' People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 241-44, 681 P.2d at 293-95, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 452-55
(testimony by a licensed marriage, family, and child counselor).
132 Experts may testify whether a defendant meets the test of insanity by lacking sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to law. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See W. LAFAvE
& A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 40 at 304 (1972); Bonnie & Slobogin, The
Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66
VA. L. REV. 427, 448 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bonnie & Slobogin]; Morse, Crazy Be-
havior; Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 602
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Morse, Crazy Behavior]; Poythress, Mental Health Expert Test
imony: Current Problems, 5J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 201 (1977).
133 These defenses are raised when people lose conscious awareness of the control
over their behavior, for example, during epileptic seizures or concussions. The de-
fenses "negate the 'voluntariness' dimension of the actus reus requirement." Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 132, at 447. See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTTr, supra note 132, § 44 at
337.
134 The diminished capacity defense allows a "defendant to show that because of in-
toxication or endogenous causes, he lacked the conscious awareness, belief, or intention
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help jurors determine whether the complainant is capable of telling
the truth.13 5 The psychiatric and psychological techniques and
expertise brought to bear on these well-accepted courtroom
presentations by experts are not different than those involved in
required by the substantive law." Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 446. See also W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 132, §42 at 325-27.
135 Defendants in rape cases may request psychiatric examinations of complainants.
The judge has the discretion to grant or deny such requests. Virgin Islands v. Scuito,
623 F.2d 869, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1980). These examinations are thought to be appropriate
where the defendant raises the issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental or
emotional condition on her veracity: "if an examination suggests that the woman is
mentally disturbed or distorts reality, the defendant is allowed to prove these highly
relevant facts." Id. at 875 n.15. See also Berger, Man's Tria Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 68-69 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Berger].
Courts may require the complaining witness in a rape case to submit to a psychiatric
examination because of an antiquated concern about women's tendencies to suffer from
delusions about sexual activity. O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape
Victim in a Criminal Rape Prosecution--or How Many Times Must a Woman be Raped? 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 119, 120 (1978)[hereinafter cited as O'Neale]. For example, Wigmore
stated that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the
female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testi-
fied to by a qualified physician." 3A J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 924a at 737 (Chadbourne
rev. 1970). Other commentators also have encouraged the use of psychiatric examina-
tions of rape complainants to detect false complaints. See Note, PsychiatricAid in Evaluat-
ing Credibility of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 IND. LJ. 98 (1950); Note, Psychiatric
Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases, 39 J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 750
(1949); Comment, Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination as Proosed Means for Testing the Com-
plainant's Competency to Allege a Sex Offense, U. ILL. L.F. 651 (1957).
Recently, the practice of allowing such examinations has been criticized and at least
one state, California, has legislatively barred their use. Comment, Psychiatric Examina-
tions of Sexual Assault Victims: A Re-evaluation, 15 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1982)[herein-
after cited as Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims]. See also O'Neale,
at 119-53.
The attacks on the use of court-ordered psychiatric examinations of complaining
witnesses are inapplicable to the use of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. The
considerations weighing against the use of such examinations are several: (1) a court-
ordered examination impinges upon the victim's right to privacy; (2) such an examina-
tion places an additional emotional hardship on the victim because of the indignity of
the exam; (3) the defendant may use the examination as a tool of harassment; (4) requir-
ing such an exam would deter victims from reporting the rapes; (5) a psychiatric exami-
nation of an uncooperative complaining witness is unreliable; and (6) presenting the
results of such an examination focuses the jurors' attention on the victim to the exclu-
sion of the defendant, resulting in the victim's behavior and emotional state being on
trial. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 875 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego
County, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176-77, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 310-13 (1966); see
also O'Neale, at 150; Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims, at 995.
Unlike court-ordered psychiatric examinations, the prosecution offers rape trauma
testimony to bolster its case. Typically, someone whom the victim has sought out for
treatment or counselling services provides the testimony. The use of such testimony in
a rape trial, therefore, does not have a similar potential for invading the victim's privacy,
producing unreliable results, or unnecessarily directing jurors' attention to the witness'
condition as a defensive subterfuge.
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presentations on rape trauma syndrome. Both involve psychologi-
cal testing, trained observation, and precise explanation of behav-
ioral and emotional processes.' 3 6
The admission of testimony by mental health professionals in
criminal trials and civil commitment proceedings, admittedly, has
been heavily criticized.' 3 7 These criticisms, however, cannot be
transferred automatically to the admission of expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome.' 38 On the contrary, some of the most vigor-
ous opponents of the widespread use of psychiatric and psychologi-
cal testimony accept and encourage the limited use of such
testimony for many of the same reasons that expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome is valuable.' 39 As one critic explains,
Mental health professionals ... are constantly concerned with observ-
ing behavioral processes. They may be especially able to identify effi-
ciently and precisely thought processes .... There seems little reason
to exclude expert evidence that efficiently identifies and describes rele-
136 The clinical method used by psychiatrists and psychologists involves a psychiatric
interview, history taking, and psychological testing. 1J. ZISKIN, COPING WrrH PsYcHIAT-
RIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 159 (3d ed. 1981). Though an expert testifying on
rape trauma syndrome may or may not follow one or another of these steps, the expert
would be using the same trained observational skills that are involved in psychiatric and
psychological diagnosis.
137 See, e.g., J. ZISKIN, supra note 136; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 COLO. L. REv. 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Ennis & Litwack, Flipping Coins]; Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132; Morse, Failed Ex-
planations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971
(1982)[hereinafter cited as Morse, Failed Explanations]; Comment, The Psychologist as Expert
Witness: Science in the Courtroom, 38 MD. L. REv. 539 (1979).
138 For example, one criticism is that psychiatrists and psychologists are allowed to
express opinions that are legal and ethical conclusions rather than scientific ones.
Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132, at 601, 602. Expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome, however, is introduced to support a factual proposition-that the woman did
not consent to intercourse-rather than to establish a legal or ethical conclusion.
Another common criticism is that psychiatrists and psychologists do not possess the
ability to predict dangerous behavior and cannot diagnose behavior reliably. J. ZISKIN,
supra note 136, at 16, 17; Ennis & Litwack, Flipping Coins, supra note 137, at 696; Morse,
Crazy Behavior, supra note 132, at 607-11; Rape trauma testimony does not involve pre-
dicting dangerous behavior nor does it involve placing an individual in a diagnostic cate-
gory such as schizoid, paranoid, depressive, or passive-aggressive.
139 See J. ZISKIN, supra note 136, at 36 (psychiatric workers' testimony should be lim-
ited to their observations regarding the current mental state of the person); Ennis &
Litwack, Flipping Coins, supra note 137, at 742 (psychiatrists should be allowed to provide
descriptive statements at civil commitment hearings); Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note
132, at 601, 605, 611, 616 (mental health experts should be limited to testifying about
behavior they observe and in limited cases about relevant, reasonably hard scientific
data; experts' special skill is observational-to perceive behaviors that non-experts may
fail to notice). Although some rape trauma syndrome experts have included their con-
clusions as to whether a complainant was raped, most of the testimony by experts on
rape trauma syndrome is a description of the complainant's condition and of the syn-
drome itself.
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vant behavior processes or patterns. Here again, experts can function
as acute observers of behavior. They can help the factfinder under-
stand an actor by describing in commonsense language his reasoning
and control processes.140
Not only do mental health professionals possess observational
skills that allow them to perceive behavior and emotional responses
that nonexperts may fail to notice, 41 they also have access to hard
data about group behavior that may assist factfinders. 142 Testimony
on rape trauma syndrome that describes the victim's psychological
and emotional responses to an attack and that provides jurors with
information about characteristic responses to rape conforms with
the well-accepted use of psychiatric and psychological testimony for
descriptive information. The argument that jurors will be misled by
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is unconvincing because
jurors routinely are required to evaluate similar psychiatric and psy-
chological testimony offered in commitment hearings, insanity de-
fense cases, and rape trials.
Another reason jurors will not be misled by rape trauma syn-
drome testimony is that jurors are capable of evaluating the meth-
ods used by rape trauma experts. Unlike much expert testimony
that relies on the results of scientific tests conducted with technolog-
ical equipment, 143 rape trauma syndrome testimony does not in-
volve any mysterious and unfathomable testing procedures.
Experts' descriptions and conclusions about the emotional and psy-
chological conditions of victims are based on observations made
during face-to-face examinations of the victim, during counseling
sessions, and through self-administered psychological tests.144 Ju-
rors reasonably can be expected to understand and to evaluate the
significance of defects in the clinical method 145 employed during
these sessions. Rather than automatically defer to a mental health
140 Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132, at 616.
141 Id. at 612;J. ZIsIN, supra note 136, at 28.
142 Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132, at 616-17.
143 Testimony based on the results of scientific tests is accused of misleading jurors
because of the "aura of mystic infallibility" that accompanies the testimony. Courts fear
that jurors will accept the results of the tests and the expert's conclusions based on those
test results without questioning the validity of the testing procedure or the expert's con-
clusions. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
144 See supra note 70.
145 These defects include the great variation in interpretation of data because of a
clinician's theoretical orientations, personal values, biases, and personalities or because
of the "soft" knowledge and "soft" data underlying psychiatry and psychology (J. Zis-
KIN, supra note 1.36, at 38), and the inability of psychiatrists or psychologists to make
accurate predictions (Ennis & Litwack, Flipping Coins, supra note 141, at 696).
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professional's testimony, jurors may in fact view such testimony with
a healthy amount of skepticism. 146 Jurors may think all psychologi-
cally-based information is unreliable, they may distrust a particular
expert, or they may be unimpressed by the validity of rape trauma
syndrome.
Effective cross-examination 47 also will reduce the danger that
rape trauma testimony will mislead jurors. 148 Cross-examination of
the expert may reveal biases that slant the expert's findings and
opinions. Cross-examination also may expose weaknesses in the un-
derlying study of rape trauma syndrome or in its application to the
case at hand.149
In addition, judges may guard against the danger of misleading
the jury without excluding the expert testimony by providing limit-
146 See People v. McDonald, 37 Gal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984);
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 464, 465 n.121. "We think laymen are naturally
skeptical about the scientific nature of psychiatric and psychological expertise, especially
when it is offered in exculpation or mitigation of criminal liability. Although our opin-
ion is based only on casual empiricism from courtroom experience and surveys of appel-
late opinions, we feel the risk of 'expert dominance' is grossly exaggerated." Id.
When a witness gives his personal opinion on the stand-even if he qualifies as an
expert-the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with a healthy
skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible. But the oppo-
site is true when the evidence is produced by a machine: like many lay persons,
jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty to proof derived from
an apparently 'scientific' mechanism, instrument, or procedure.
Id.
147 To present an effective cross-examination, the defense attorney will have to be
familiar with clinical psychology, post-traumatic stress disorders, or rape trauma syn-
drome. But "the corrective value of skilled cross-examination is much more dependable
when the witness is relying on his own observations (including psychological test instru-
ments) and clinical wisdom [as would be the case with rape trauma testimony] than when
he reports the results of a test which is said to speak for itself." Bonnie & Slobogin,
supra note 132, at 465-66 n.121.
148 See United States v. Baler, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975)(spectrographic analysis
admissible where competent witnesses were available to expose weaknesses and limita-
tions in expert's analysis, where defense counsel demonstrated thorough knowledge of
subject in detailed cross-examination, and where court instructed jury that expert analy-
sis could be disregarded if they found expert had inadequate education or experience to
provide analysis); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 994 (1971)(prosecution's testimony on neutron activation analysis was proper
where defendant presented well-qualified witnesses who developed fully their criticisms
of prosecution's evidence); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968)(defend-
ant produced scientific witnesses to challenge conclusions of the state's witnesses and
the methods and test used to reach those conclusions).
149 See State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982)(Wahl,J., dissenting)(cross-ex-
amination of expert revealed that the complainant's symptoms suggesting rape trauma
syndrome could have been caused by events in her life prior to the rape). In Allewalt v.
State, 61 Md. App. 3d 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985), for example, defense counsel's cross-
examination of the expert could have explored whether the complainant's post-trau-
matic stress disorder was caused by marital difficulties and emotional problems that pre-
dated the alleged rape.
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ing instructions. °50 The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying
Rule 405 encourages the use of limiting instructions.15 1 Such an
instruction might remind jurors of their responsibility to weigh all
the evidence, to reject any evidence they consider to be unreliable,
and to make an independent judgment as to the facts of the case. 152
A case-by-case balance of the probative value of rape trauma
syndrome testimony against the tendency of the evidence to mislead
is the correct approach for courts to adopt. Becausejurors can eval-
uate the underpinnings of rape trauma syndrome testimony, cross-
examination can reveal defects in testimony, and limiting instruc-
tions can warn jurors not to rely unquestioningly on the testimony,
rape trauma syndrome testimony will not mislead jurors in every
case. Wholesale exclusion of rape trauma syndrome testimony,
therefore, is inappropriate. Instead, courts should weigh the proba-
tive value of the testimony with its tendency to mislead on a case-by-
case basis and exclude rape trauma syndrome testimony only in the
rare cases where its tendency to mislead substantially outweighs its
probative value. 153
C. EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER RULE 702
In recognition of the fact that "an intelligent evaluation of facts
[by a jury] is often difficult or impossible without the application of
some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,"' 154 the
Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the admission of testimony by
expert witnesses.1 55 Under Rule 702 the test for admissibility of
expert testimony is whether the testimony will assist the trier of
150 United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905
(1978) (evidence was properly admitted because trial judge took steps to minimize prej-
udicial impact of evidence through jury instructions); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67,
§ 185, at 440 n.32;J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 403[01], at 403-8.
151 FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee note.
152 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 403[01), at 403-8.
153 Excluding the testimony because it is misleading may be appropriate where the
expert is unqualified to discuss rape trauma syndrome, the expert has had too little op-
portunity to observe the complainant, or the complainant suffered from a post-traumatic
stress disorder prior to the alleged rape. See Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 487
A.2d 664 (1985) (court excluded testimony as unduly prejudicial in case where com-
plainant received counseling for depression prior to alleged rape).
154 FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee note.
155 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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fact. 156 An examination of the admissibility of an expert's testimony
under this test can be broken down into three parts. 157 First, expert
testimony must satisfy a "helpfulness requirement."' 5 8 Second, the
testifying witness must qualify as an expert.' 59 Third, the subject
matter of the testimony must meet a reliability or general accept-
ance requirement. 160
1. The "Helpfulness" Requirement
The primary requirement of Rule 702 is that the expert testi-
mony assist the factfinder in understanding the evidence or deter-
mining a fact in issue.16' The Advisory Committee's Note suggests
that helpfulness is determined by the "'common sense inquiry
whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intel-
ligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the
subject involved in the dispute.' 1162 Rule 702 is phrased broadly163
and permits greater use of expert testimony than does the common
law. 164
Because trial courts determine whether expert testimony is
156 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note;J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
101, 702[01] at 702-6.
157 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[01] at 702-7, 702-8. Courts that
have enumerated the necessary considerations for admissibility under Rule 702 have
included a fourth requirement: the probative value of the expert's testimony must not
be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d
541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977)
(citing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)). This fourth re-
quirement is considered in the discussion of Rule 403, supra text accompanying notes
99-153.
158 See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington Northern, 608 F.2d 796, 798 n.3 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d at
1268 (6th Cir. 1977).
159 See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548
F.2d at 1268 (6th Cir. 1977)(citing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152 (9th Cir.
1973)).
160 Rule 702 does not explicitly embody this requirement. Courts, however, demand
some assurance that the proffered testimony has an accepted scientific foundation. Tes-
timony by an expert "is not admissible if the court believes that the state of the pertinent
art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by
an expert." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 14 at 31. For further discussion of this
requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 229-93.
161 FED. R. EVID. 702. See Taenzlerv. Burlington Northern, 608 F.2d at 798 n.3;J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[01] at 702-6 and -7.
162 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (quoting, Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5
VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)).
163 FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee note; Mannino v. International Mfg., 650
F.2d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1981) (Rule 702 is to be broadly interpreted).
164 United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (the trend is towards admissibility under the
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properly admissible on a case-by-case basis,1 65 there are few blanket
rules excluding or admitting such testimony. Courts regularly ac-
cept expert testimony in certain fields because it is helpful to the
jury.166 Medicine and engineering are two such fields. 167 But the
variety of expert testimony admitted outside these areas establishes
that expert testimony need not be linked to universally recognized
sciences to be admissible. Courts have admitted expert testimony
on the modus operandi of pickpockets, 68 the "ways and language"
of bookmakers, 169 the meaning of gambling jargon, °70 the
geographic source of certain marijuana, 1 1 and code words and the
meaning of certain language used in drug trafficking. 172
In addition, expert testimony is admissible even when jurors
could draw conclusions without the expert's help. For example,
prosecutors use experts to compare the features of defendants and
their possessions with those of persons and articles found in surveil-
Federal Rules); P. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 99, at 264, 267; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 101, 702[03] at 702-21.
The traditional test for helpfulness under the common law is whether the subject
matter of the testimony is "so distinctively related to some science, profession, business,
or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average laymen." C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 67, § 13 at 29-31. The Federal Rules are much broader than traditional tests for
admissibility. See McElhaney, supra note 113. A test that admits expert testimony only
when the evidence is beyond the comprehension of the jurors without such testimony
"is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness expressed in Rule 702." J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[02] at 702-9; see also P. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 99, at
264. But see United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (expert testimony
must provide jurors with a system of analysis that is likely to add to jurors' common
understanding of the issue); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977)(court applies the traditional "beyond the ken of the average
layman" test for admissibility).
165 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, T 702 [02] at 702-11, 702-12.
166 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[02] at 702-8, 702-9; McEIhaney,
supra note 113, at 475.
167 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 1 702[02] at 702-8, 702-9; McElhaney,
supra note 113, at 475 (citing 2 JoNES ON EVIDENCE § 423 (5th ed. 1958). In medical
malpractice cases and design defect cases, plaintiffs may fail to meet their burdens of
proof unless expert testimony is offered. See Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d
844, 848 (10th Cir. 1979)(only a qualified engineer was capable of testifying as to the
design defect of a pressure cooker); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (3d Cir.
1976)("where the issue concerns a product's design. . . expert opinion is the only avail-
able method to establish defectiveness, at least where the design is not patently defec-
tive"); Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. L. REV. 834 (1966).
168 United States v.Jackson, 425 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
169 United States v. Barletta, 565 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1977).
170 United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alfonso, 552
F.2d 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
171 United States v.Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907
(1979).
172 United States v. Dawson, 556 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 727 F.2d 1101
(1984).
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lance photographs.175 Rule 702 thus does not forbid the use of
expert testimony when jurors have the skills or common under-
standing to draw conclusions without the testimony.1 74 Rather, it
focuses on whether expert testimony will assist the factfinder by ad-
ding precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach conclusions.' 75
Whether expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome meets the
helpfulness requirement is in dispute. Several courts have ruled
that rape trauma syndrome testimony is relevant to the issue of con-
sent and, therefore, is helpful to the trier of fact in determining
whether a rape occurred. 176 Another court has held, however, that
rape trauma syndrome testimony is of no help to the jury. 1 7 7 The
court found that rape trauma syndrome is not an accurate or reliable
test for whether a rape occurred and that evidence about typical re-
actions to rape would not help the jury to decide whether a particu-
lar individual was raped. 178
An understanding of the content of expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome, combined with an appreciation of the pervasive
societal misperceptions of rape victims, supports the conclusion that
rape trauma syndrome testimony meets the helpfulness require-
ment. The testimony satisfies the requirement by bringing greater
173 See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1084 n.14 (9th Cir. 1983)(expert
permitted to testify regarding similarities between clothing seized from defendant and
that worn by robber in surveillance photograph); United States v. Collins, 559 F.2d 561,
565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977) (expert permitted to testify that shoes and
briefcase found in defendant's apartment were most probably the same as those shown
in surveillance photograph); United States v. Snow, 552 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1977)(expert
permitted to compare photographs). But see United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 148-
50 (9th Cir. 1974)(error to allow comparison in this particular case because facts were
not beyond jury's common experience). See also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
101, 702[02] at 702-10, 702-11.
174 See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 463-64.
175 State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980).
176 See, e.g., State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984); State v. Marks,
231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982); see also State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 234
(Minn. 1982)(Wahl, J., dissenting); State v. Liddell, - Mont. -. , 685 P.2d 918 (1984);
State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
177 State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 232; see also People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (rape trauma syndrome is not generally used or
relied upon by scientific community to prove that a rape has occurred); State v. Saldana,
324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982).
178 Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accurately and relia-
bly determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may fol-
low any psychologically traumatic event. . . . At best, the syndrome describes only
symptoms that occur with some frequency, but makes no pretense of describing
every single case. . . . The jury must not decide this case on the basis of how most
people react to rape or on whether Fuller's [the victim's] reactions were the typical
reactions of a person who has been a victim of rape. Rather, the jury must decide
what happenedin this case, and whether the elements of the alleged crime have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30 (emphasis in original).
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precision and depth to the jury's determination of whether the com-
plainant consented to intercourse. First, an expert can assist jurors
in understanding the emotional and psychological consequences ex-
perienced by the complainant as a result of the alleged rape. 179
Though the complainant could be questioned directly about these
consequences or lay witnesses could describe the reactions they ob-
served in the complainant, 80 an expert will be able both to perceive
these consequences more accurately and fully, and to describe them
more precisely than could lay witnesses.18 1 Experts are trained ob-
servers 8 2 who treat and observe rape victims regularly. 83 Courts,
therefore, can expect them to perceive or inquire about conditions
that might go unnoticed by laypersons.18 4
Additionally, an expert testifying on rape trauma syndrome can
assist jurors by providing them with reliable information on charac-
teristic responses and behavior of rape victims. 18 5 Though there
may be general public awareness of the traumatizing effect of rape
on its victims, jurors are unlikely to be familiar with the findings of
the extensive studies on rape victims. Nor is it likely that each juror
will have had first-hand experience working with rape victims. It is
likely, however, that the jurors' general knowledge regarding the
emotional and psychological consequences of rape to some extent
will be influenced by pervasive societal misperceptions about
rape.'8 6
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome will enhance the ac-
curacy of jurors' deliberations in rape cases by exposing myths
about rape. 8 7 Several myths about rape are particularly significant
in cases where consent is at issue. One myth is that "interaction
between friends or relatives does not result in rape."' 88 Another
179 See supra text accompanying notes 128-142.
180 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
182 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 114, at 1341; Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132,
at 612, 616.
183 See infra notes 128-31.
184 Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 132, at 611.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 15-54.
186 See infra text accompanying notes 193-95.
187 The California Supreme Court, which rejected the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on rape trauma syndrome to prove lack of consent, conceded that such testimony
"may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held miscon-
ceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the
constraints of popular myths." People v. Bedsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 457.
188 A. BURGESS & L. HoLmsTRoM, THE VICIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL REACTIONS
176 (1983). In fact, as various studies show, rapists may be strangers attacking by sur-
prise or they may be well known to the victim. Id. See also Berger, supra note 135, at 24
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relevant myth is that women charge rape after fantasizing such an
event.18 9 Other myths that could color jurors' thinking on the issue
of consent are that women desire to be raped, 190 that women can-
not be raped against their will and thus are merely consenting part-
ners in a sexual encounter,19 1 and that all legitimate rape victims
possess certain attributes and demonstrate identical reactions im-
mediately following the rape. 192
Several studies show that jurors bring to the courtroom defini-
tions of rape that differ from legal definitions of the crime.' 93 Stud-
ies also suggest that these understandings and misperceptions
influence jurors' determinations of whether the complainant con-
sented to intercourse.' 9 4 In fact, defense attorneys often specifically
(citing Weis & Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, in RAPE VIC-
TIMOLOGY 91 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
189 A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 188, at 193; Berger, supra note 135, at 21-
22.
190 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL. 311, 312 (1975).
191 Id.; Weis & Broges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 ISSUES
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 85 (1971).
192 One commentator describes a "genuine" rape victim as follows:
Like negligence's reasonable man, the true victim of rape exercises due care and
caution for her own safety. She possesses a reputation for chastity in her commu-
nity. Additionally, she copes well with aggression, usually meeting force with force.
Should she fail to overpower her aggressor and rape occurs, she will make an imme-
diate complaint in a hysterical state.
Berger, supra note 135, at 23-24 (quoting Comment, Rape in Illinois, A Denial of Equal
Protection, 8 JOHN MARSHALLJ. PRAC. & PROc. 457, 469 (1975).
193 A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 188, at 168. A study by Klemmack and
Klemmack asked a sample of women if seven situations, each meeting the legal defini-
tion of rape, constituted a rape. "An especially striking result was the importance of the
degree of interpersonal relationship between assailant and victim. 'If any relationship is
known to exist between the victim and the accused, no matter how casual, the propor-
tion of those who consider the event rape drops to less than 50 percent.'" Id.
Kalven and Zeisel, in their study on the jury process, conclude "that the jury
chooses to redefine the crime of rape in terms of its notions of assumption of risk." H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 254 (1966). They explain that
[tihe jury, as we come to see it, does not limit itself to this one issue [consent]; it
goes on to weigh the woman's conduct in the prior history of the affair. It closely,
and often harshly, scrutinizes the female complainant and is moved to be lenient
with the defendant whenever there are suggestions of contributory behavior on her
part.
Id. at 249.
194 Kalven and Zeisel found that in "aggravated rape" cases (cases in which there was
evidence of violence, in which there were several assailants, or in which the defendant
and victim were strangers at the time of attack) judges disagree with the jury's decision
to acquit the defendant in 12% of the cases. But in "simple rape" cases (cases in which
none of the aggravating circumstances is present) judges disagreed with the jury's deci-
sion to acquit the defendant in 60% of the cases. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 193,
at 252-53. The increased discrepancy between the judge's and jury's decisions suggest
that jurors may be swayed by the absence of the mythical attributes of a genuine rape
victim in simple rape cases.
Feild's study found that one factor influencing jurors' decisions was whether the
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design their trial strategies to exploit jurors' misperceptions about
rape. 195 An expert's testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome
could be an important tool with which to educate the jury about
actual characteristics of rape victims, to limit the influence ofjurors'
misperceptions about legitimate rape victims, and thereby to ensure
that the jurors' evaluation of the facts is as accurate as possible.
In addition to being helpful in limiting the effect of mispercep-
tions about rape on the factfinding process, rape trauma syndrome
testimony helps jurors to evaluate the complainant's psychological
and emotional condition following the alleged rape. The helpful-
ness of rape trauma syndrome testimony to jurors' evaluations of
the complainant is analogous to the helpfulness of expert testimony
on complainants' or defendants' mental and emotional conditions in
other criminal cases and commitment proceedings. Although
factfinders may be able to draw inferences about the nature, extent,
and consequences of mental disorders without the help of expert
witnesses, 96 expert testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists is
admitted routinely in insanity defense cases, competency hearings,
rape was "precipitory." Precipitory rapes were those rapes in which the actions of the
victim suggested that she "was asking for it." Feild found anecdotal evidence that
"precipitory rapes" were treated more leniently than "nonprecipitory" rapes. Feild,
Rape Trials and Jurors'Decisions: A Psychological Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant, and
Case Characteristics, 3 LAw & HuMAN BErAv. 261, 264-65 (1979). In other words, when a
victim fails to act as jurors expect a "legitimate" rape victim to act, jurors are less likely
to decide that the victim was raped.
A study of rape arrests in the District of Columbia from 1971 to 1976 found that the
closer the relationship between the victim and defendant, the less likely it was the de-
fendant would be convicted. Williams, Few Convictions in Rape Cases: Empirical Evidence
Concerning Some Alternative Explanations, 9J. ClM. JusT. 29, 37 (1981).
195 Defense attorneys skillfully play upon the societal myths surrounding rape.
The defense presents the victim in the worst possible light. In the strategy of blam-
ing the victim, defense lawyers trade on current normative expectations for sex
roles. They trade on the tendency of the public at large and apparently also many
jurors to blame the victim. Rape is not seen by the public as the result of social
expectations in which females are defined as the appropriate objects of male vio-
lence. Rather, certain girls or women are seen as 'asking for it,' 'fantasizing about
it,' or 'just plain lying.'
A. BURGESS & L. HotassraoM, supra note 188 at 172, 173.
Because of common misperceptions about rape victims' involvement in the assault
on them and the popular defense strategy of blaming the victim, researchers and writers
have suggested that in a rape trial, "the rape victim becomes the defendant, that is, she
is on trial to prove her innocence." Feild, supra note 194 at 281; O'Neale, supra note 135,
at 142, 143 & 150.
196 See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 335 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)(error to exclude
lay testimony on defendant's sanity); Alexander v. State, 358 So. 2d 379 (Miss. 1978)(lay
witness may testify regarding defendant's sanity only when witness has had opportunity
to observe defendant at a time when defendant was insane); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra
note 132, at 463.
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and civil commitment proceedings. 197 Expert testimony on battered
wife syndrome is offered to explain the behavior and psychological
condition of the batterer' 98 or the battered spouse.' 99 Although
factfinders may be "acquainted with interspousal conflicts and the
effect of these conflicts upon the persons involved," 20 0 courts have
held that expert testimony on battered wife syndrome satisfies the
197 State statutes allow or require the court to appoint psychiatrists to examine a de-
fendant who raises the insanity defense. See, e.g., IND. STAT. CODE ANN. §35-5-2-2
(BURNS 1979) ("when notice of insanity defense is filed, the court shall appoint two [2] or
three [3] competent disinterested psychiatrists to examine the defendant, and to testify
at trial"); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 46.03 §3(a) (Vernon 1979)(mental health
experts may be appointed by court to examine defendant and testify regarding insanity
defense at trial).
In addition to admitting testimony by psychiatrists on the issue of insanity, many
states admit freely testimony by psychologists on the issue of defendants' sanity or
mental condition. See People v. Whitaker, 87 Ill. App. 3d 563, 410 N.E.2d 166 (1980)
(psychologist testified about defendant's mental condition); People v. Lewis, 75 Iln.
App. 3d 568, 393 N.E.2d 1380 (1979) (psychologists may testify about defendant's com-
petence to stand trial); Burgess v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1978) (clinical
psychologist may testify regarding defendant's mental condition); State v. Tafoya, 94
N.M. 762, 617 P.2d 151 (1980) (psychologist may testify as an expert witness); MD. CTs.
& JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §9-120 (Supp. 1979)(qualified psychologists "may testify on
ultimate issues, including insanity, competency to stand trial, and matters within the
scope of that psychologist's special knowledge, in any case in any court").
For other cases involving testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists, see United
States v. Bilson, 648 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1981);Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
For a discussion criticizing the courts' current practice of admitting freely testimony
by psychologists and treating equally testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists, see
Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness, supra note 137.
See, e.g., United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414, 418-20 (7th Cir. 1976)(expert testi-
mony by psychologist about defendant's sanity); Blunt v. United States, 389 F.2d 545
(D.C. Cir. 1967)(psychologist testifying on defendant's competence to stand trial);Jen-
kins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962)(testimony by psychologist in in-
sanity defense case); People v. Crawford, 66 Mich. App. 581, 239 N.W.2d 670
(1976)(psychologist testifying on defendant's competence to stand trial).
Not all courts will permit psychologists to testify about the ultimate issue of a de-
fendant's sanity. Some courts reserve this issue for testimony by psychiatrists. See, e.g.,
People v. Manning, 61 Ill. App. 3d 558, 378 N.E.2d 227 (1978)(dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 390 N.E.2d 903 (1979). See also Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness, supra
note 137, at 549.
198 See State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980)(expert testimony on bat-
tered wife syndrome offered in husband's trial for attempted murder to show that his
behavior was consistent with that of wife batterers and was not caused by insanity).
199 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979)(expert testimony
on battered wife syndrome offered in wife's trial for murder of husband to substantiate
her claim that she acted in self-defense); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678
(198 1)(expert testimony on battered wife syndrome offered in woman's trial for murder
of her boyfriend to substantiate her claim of self-defense); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
200 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 654 n.20 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)(Ne-
beker, J., dissenting).
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helpfulness requirement.20 1
Courts also have found that expert testimony on familial child
sexual abuse syndrome assists the factfinder.20 2 A concurring opin-
ion in State v. Middleton 203 drew a helpful comparison between the
use of expert testimony on battered wife syndrome and of familial
child sexual abuse syndrome:
Battered woman syndrome testimony is said to enhance the jury's un-
derstanding of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the criminal
act. Evidence of familial child sexual abuse syndrome could provide
an explanation of the victim's reluctance to pursue prosecution after
the criminal event. The former explains the psychological effect on
the defendant of a pattern of aggression against her preceding her
criminal act. The latter illuminates the psychological effect on the vic-
tim of the criminal act itself.20 4
If factfinders are assisted by expert testimony on the psychological
effects of sexual abuse on child victims, and the psychological state
of battered women, it is entirely consistent to conclude that
201 Id. at 634-635; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Baker,
120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980).
But see People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980)(doctor's opin-
ion as to whether battered women "tend to remain with their mates served no useful
purpose in woman's trial for murder of boyfriend"); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374
(Wyo. 1981) (testimony on battered wife syndrome inadmissible where inadequate foun-
dation existed for proposition that defendant was a battered wife).
See generally Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
895 (1981); Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L.
REv. 1 (1982); Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome,
supra note 88, at 361-65.
202 In State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983), testimony on familial
child sexual abuse syndrome was offered to explain why the 14-year old complainant
denied her previous allegations that she had been raped by her father. In holding the
testimony to be admissible the court stated:
Because the jurors said they had no experience with victims of child abuse, we as-
sume they would not have been exposed to the contention that it is common for
children to report familial sexual abuse and then retract the story. Such evidence
might well help a jury make a more informed decision in evaluating the credibility
of a testifying child.
Id. at 437, 657 P.2d at 1220. See also State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330
(1982)(psychiatrist's testimony that complainant in rape prosecution demonstrated be-
havior consistent with that of sexually abused children held to be admissible); State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984) (expert testimony about child sexual abuse is help-
ful to lay jurors and is admissible); State v. Carlson, 360 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (psychiatric testimony on whether behavior of children is consistent with sexual
abuse is admissible); People v. Benjamin, 103 A.D.2d 663, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1984)
(average juror does not have general awareness of children's reactions to sexual abuse;
expert testimony on child sexual abuse thus is helpful to jury). But see State v. Danielski,
350 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (expert testimony on typical familial sexual
abuse symptoms and behavior inadmissible).




factfinders will be assisted by expert testimony on the psychological
and emotional state of rape victims.
2. Qualification as an Expert
Before testimony on rape trauma syndrome can be admitted
under Rule 702, the witness providing the testimony must demon-
strate that he or she has the requisite qualifications to be considered
an expert. 20 5 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that an
expert witness' testimony will assist the factfinder.206 The trial
court has broad discretion in judging a person's qualification as an
expert.20 7 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 702 clarifies the
standard to be applied under the Federal Rules:
The Rule [702] is broadly phrased .... [T]he expert is viewed, not in
a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 'knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training or education.' Thus within the scope of the rule are not
only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physi-
cists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled'
witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values. 208
Commentators emphasize that Rule 702 was designed to allow lib-
eral decisions regarding the qualifications of experts. 20 9 Moreover,
cases have established that a person need not be the best or most
experienced possible witness to qualify as an expert, 210 nor does an
205 FED. R. EVID. 702.
206 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[04] at 702-28, 702-29.
207 FED. R. EVID. 104(a); United States v. Bilson, 648 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1981); Taen-
zler v. Burlington Northern, 608 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1979); N.V. Maatschappij, etc. v.
A.O. Smith Corporation, 590 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1978);J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 101, 702[04] at T 702-22, 702-23.
The trial court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be
manifestly erroneous. Berdeaux v. Gamble Alden Life Insurance Co., 528 F.2d 987 (5th
Cir. 1976).
208 FED. R. EvlD. 702 advisory committee note. The standard set forth in Rule 702 is
at least as broad as that applied under the common law. Wigmore suggests that the only
true criterion for determining the expertness of the witness is whether "[o]n this subject
can a jury receive from this person appreciable help." 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1923
(1978). McCormick's test for the qualifications of an expert is only slightly less broad. A
person must establish that he or she has the requisite skill, knowledge, or experience in
a particular field so as to be able to render an opinion in that field that will probably aid
the trier of fact in arriving at the truth. The source of an expert's skill, knowledge, or
experience may be solely reading, practice, or both. And though a court may disqualify
as an expert one who is not a member of a certain profession, such as a doctor, engineer,
or chemist, an expert usually will not need to be a specialist within his or her profession.
C. McCORMICK, supra note 67, § 13 at 30.
209 P. Rothstein, supra note 99, at 264; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101,
702(04] at 702-21 to 702-29.
210 In United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1976), the court admitted testi-
mony about the defendant's sanity by a psychologist who did not have a medical degree
and had only three months of post-doctoral clinical experience. The court stated that
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expert need to be absolutely certain about his or her testimony.21'
Clear minimum qualifications for witnesses seeking to testify as
experts on rape trauma syndrome have not emerged from the case-
by-case 2 12 decisions as to an expert's qualifications. 213 Though few
courts have found an expert unqualified to testify about rape trauma
syndrome,214 several courts have accepted a variety of educational
backgrounds and work experiences as adequate qualifications for an
expert testifying on rape trauma syndrome. Courts have accepted
as qualified experts persons who have experience treating 215 or ob-
serving rape victims, 216 persons who have counseling experience, 217
the best or most qualified doctor was not necessary; any defects in the expert's qualifica-
tions go to the weight attached to the testimony rather than to its admissibility.
211 See, e.g., United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 926 (expert's testimony identifying hairs from mask worn during robbery as being
similar to defendant's was admissible even though expert admitted testimony was less
than certain); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975); United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1049 (2d Cir. 1971)(expert testimony
comparing handwriting samples admitted even though expert could not be sure that the
samples were prepared by the same person).
212 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[04] at 702-25, 702-26.
213 In the dissenting opinion in People v. Bledsoe, 140 Cal. App. 3d 267, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1983),Justice Wiener suggests a few qualifications that should be required of
witnesses testifying on rape trauma syndrome. Justice Wiener states that experience in
treating and observing the symptoms of rape victims should not be sufficient to qualify a
person as an expert. Justice Wiener suggests that an expert also must have substantive
information on causes of trauma and must receive relevant data in a controlled manner.
Id. at 734, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
214 In State v. Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 689 P.2d 901 (1984), the court refused to
allow testimony by an emergency room physician about rape trauma syndrome because
there was no evidence to show that the witness-physician was qualified in psychiatry.
The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that a social worker whose only experience with rape
victims or post traumatic stress disorders consisted of her work with the complainant in
this case was unqualified to testify as an expert about rape crisis syndrome. State v.
Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475 N.E.2d 486 (1984). In State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982), the court found that the witness' counseling experience and
bachelor's degree did not qualify her to testify whether the alleged rape victim was able
to distinguish between reality and fantasy or whether the alleged victim was telling the
truth or fabricating a story. The witness was the director of the Mankato, Minnesota
Victim Assistance Program and had counseled the alleged rape victim over a ten week
period. The witness' education included a bachelor's degree in psychology and social
work. The court specifically objected to the witness' lack of medical education or train-
ing. But the Saldana court did not state that the witness was unqualified to testify regard-
ing rape trauma syndrome. The expert's testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome
was held inadmissible on other grounds. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-32.
In the companion case to Saldana, State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982), a
dissenting justice argued that a medical doctor who as a resident had treated rape vic-
tims was qualified to testify as an expert on rape trauma syndrome. State v. McGee, 324
N.W.2d at 233-34 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
215 See State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d at 233-34 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (medical doctor who
had examined rape victims was qualified to testify regarding rape truama syndrome).
216 In State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978), the Oregon appellate
Court rejected the defense's challenge to the qualifications of an expert who testified
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as well as persons who have extensive education and experience in
psychiatry and medicine.218
Because courts have not established uniform criteria governing
the requisite qualifications for experts testifying on rape trauma syn-
drome, it is instructive to examine the qualifications accepted or re-
quired of experts testifying on similar matters to help define the
appropriate boundaries for acceptable qualifications. First, a wit-
ness need not be a medical doctor to be qualified to testify about
rape trauma syndrome. In a civil rights action brought by a prison
inmate against state officers because of a rape in the prison infir-
mary, a medical behavioral scientist was permitted to testify about
the psychological disturbances experienced by the plaintiff after be-
ing raped.21 9 The expert testified that after the rape, the plaintiff
was depressed, suffered rape flashbacks, could not develop friend-
ships, and perceived himself to be a woman. The expert concluded
that the rape had caused these emotional disturbances. 220 Because
the expert did not have a medical degree, the defendant state offi-
cials objected to the testimony as being outside the witness' realm of
that the alleged victim's emotional state comported with that of most women who are
victims of sexual abuse. The court was satisfied with the expert's qualifications: the
expert held a master's degree in social work; she had worked at a shelter for sexually and
physically abused children; and, as a rape victim advocate, she had observed more than
100 rape victims. Id. at 416, 587 P.2d at 1047.
217 In State v. Young, the Kansas Supreme Court permitted a licensed clinical psycholo-
gist to testify about rape trauma syndrome. State v. Young, slip op. (Kan.July 26, 1985).
The court stated that "[b]ecause the syndrome concerns a body of knowledge common
to the practice of psychiatry and psychology, pyschologists may be as competent to diag-
nose rape trauma syndrome as psychiatrists." Id. The California Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court had not abused its discretion by permitting a graduate student in
psychology to testify as an expert regarding rape trauma syndrome. People v. Stanley,
36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d 302, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1984). Although the court was not
"overwhelmed" by the graduate student's qualifications, which included course work in
rape counseling, counseling ten to twenty rape victims, and six years of clinical experi-
ence, the court focused upon the student's extensive clinical experience and permitted
her to be qualified as an expert. Id. at 261 n.5, 681 P.2d at 307 n.5, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 466
n.5. In State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz. 270, 674 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1983), the trial
court admitted testimony by a counselor at a mental health clinic that showed the vic-
tim's post-rape emotional reactions were consistent with other rape victims' reactions.
218 In State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982), the Kansas Supreme Court
found that a board certified psychiatrist and neurologist who practiced psychiatry and
taught at the Menninger Foundation qualified as an expert to testify about post-trau-
matic stress disorders, rape trauma syndrome, and the alleged victim's experience with
rape trauma syndrome. Although the defendant did not challenge the expert's qualifica-
tions to testify about rape trauma syndrome, the court's recital of the psychiatrist's im-
pressive credentials implies that such a challenge would have been unsuccessful. Id. at
653, 647 P.2d at 1298-99. See also State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (psychia-
trist specializing in diagnosis and treatment of rape victims qualified as expert).
219 Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
220 Id. at 1121.
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expertise. In rejecting this contention, the court stated that "[a]s a
medical behavioral scientist Dr. Peeples perhaps would not have
been qualified to testify about diagnosing or treating an illness, but
he was as qualified as anyone to discuss the links between trauma
(the rape in this case) and its medical complications (whether
physiological, psychological, or behavioral) V"22 1
The medical behavioral scientist's descriptive testimony about
the psychological and emotional condition of a rape victim and the
source of the victim's disturbances corresponds closely to an ex-
pert's testimony on rape trauma syndrome. The admission of the
behavioral scientist's testimony thus strongly suggests that a witness
need not be a medical doctor to be qualified to discuss the traumatic
aftermath of rape. 222
A second guideline for determining an expert's qualifications
was settled by the court in State v. Middleton:223 an expert may be
qualified to testify about behavioral patterns and psychological reac-
tions by virtue of appropriate work experiences. 224 In Middleton, two
social workers who worked with abused children were qualified as
experts to testify about the reactions of young victims of family sex-
ual abuse in general. The social workers also testified about the
similarities between the particular child's behavior and that of the
typical victim.2 25 One social worker was a county juvenile coun-
selor. The other was a child protective social worker.2 26 Both social
workers had worked with sexually abused children; one estimated
that she had worked with three to four hundred children who had
been raped by family members.2 27 If the psychological make-up of
the child victim of familial sexual abuse can be understood and de-
scribed by persons through practical experience alone, it is consis-
221 Id. at 1122.
222 The holding in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637 (D.C. Ct. App.
1979) supports this assertion. The court held that a clinical psychologist who did not
have a medical degree could not, as a matter of law, be disqualified from testifying as an
expert on battered wife syndrome. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals based its
ruling on the often-cited case, Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (1962). In Jenkins,
the court held that the defense experts, who were psychologists without medical de-
grees, were qualified to diagnose the presence of specific mental illnesses even though
they may not have been qualified to treat those illnesses. Jenkins, 307 F.2d at 644. See
also State v. Young, slip op. (Kan. July 26, 1985) (psychologist is as competent as psychi-
atrist to diagnose rape trauma syndrome).
223 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
224 Id. at 430-34, 657 P.2d at 1216-18.
225 Id. at 430, 657 P.2d at 1216. But see State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 475
N.E.2d 486 (1984) (social worker who had diagnosed only one case of rape trauma syn-
drome was unqualified to testify as expert about rape crisis syndrome).
226 State v. Middleton, 294 Or. at 432, 657 P.2d at 1217.
227 Id. at 433 n.6, 657 P.2d at 1218 n.6.
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tent to allow the psychological and emotional condition of adult
rape victims to be described by persons who have extensive experi-
ence working with these victims.
The cases that directly involve the qualifications of experts testi-
fying on rape trauma syndrome and those that are analogous permit
the following conclusion: a person's extensive experience working
with rape victims or a person's education combined with some expe-
rience working with rape victims 228 should establish the person as
an expert for the purposes of testifying on rape trauma syndrome.
Medical doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists who treat or coun-
sel rape victims should be included in this group of experts. Social
workers and rape victim counselors who do not have degrees in
clinical psychology or medicine, but who have extensive experience
working with rape victims should also be qualified as experts. This
experience gives them the understanding and insight necessary to
assist the jury.
3. Reliability Requirement
When the judiciary recognizes the subject matter of an expert's
testimony as being a proper subject for expert testimony, the prof-
fered expert testimony need only meet the requirements of helpful-
ness and a qualified expert. 229 When the judiciary has not
recognized the proffered testimony as being a proper subject for
expert testimony, as when the testimony is based on a newly discov-
ered scientific principle or a newly developed scientific technique, 230
courts require a showing that the technique or principle upon which
228 In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (1962), the court stressed that "[t]he
critical factor in respect to admissibility is the actual experience of the witness and the
probable probative value of his opinion." Id. at 646. The approach of the court inJen-
kins remains the approved approach of courts today despite the intervening enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. 1259, 1273
(E.D. Pa. 1975), afd, 544 F.2d 138 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977);J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[04] at 702-23 to 25.
Commentators considering the qualifications that should be required of psychia-
trists and psychologists who testify in insanity defense cases, civil commitment cases,
and sentencing hearings have stressed the need for recent, relevant, and extensive
clinical experience. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 457; Morse, Crazy Behavior,
supra note 132, at 622.
229 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[03] at 702-15.
230 For examples of such principles or techniques see United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) (sound spectrometry); United
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (forward looking infrared system); United
States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971)(neutron
activation analysis); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aft'd,
563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978)(psycholinguistics); Cha-
tom v. State, 348 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), rev'd, 348 So. 2d 838 (Ala.), acq.
348 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)(atomic absorption).
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the testimony is based is sufficiently reliable that it will increase the
accuracy of the factfinder's determination. 23' Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 does not state explicitly the standard by which reliability
must be measured, nor does the Advisory Committee's Note explain
the appropriate standard. In the absence of clear direction from the
Federal Rules, courts have taken two approaches to determine
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
Courts have applied the "general acceptance" test232 established in
Frye v. United States 23 3 or they have applied a balancing test for
admissibility.23 4
The first test for reliability of scientific evidence, the general
acceptance test, was introduced in a decision rejecting the admissi-
bility of the results of a lie detector examination. 235 In Frye v. United
States,23 6 the court found that the accuracy of the lie detection de-
vice had not received adequate recognition from physiological and
psychological authorities to produce admissible evidence. 237 The
court reasoned that:
[j]ust when a scientific principle crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
231 j. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[03] at 702-15.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980)(expert testi-
mony based on shoeprints was shown to be generally accepted among crime techni-
cians); United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979)(expert testimony on hair comparisons done by optical microscope must be in
conformity with generally accepted explanatory theory); United States v. Kilgus, 571
F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1978)(Court stated that forward looking infrared system is not gener-
ally accepted by scientific community as a means of identifying remote objects); United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 559 (6th Cir. 1977)(court found that ion microprobic
analysis of human hair has not reached level of general acceptance in the field); United
States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(voiceprint evidence not admissible
for failing to meet general acceptance test).
233 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)(court rejected admissibility of results of a simple lie
detection device because device had not gained general acceptance among physiological
or psychological authorities).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979) (court balanced reliability and helpfulness of evidence against the ten-
dency of the evidence to mislead or confuse the jury, or to be unfairly prejudicial);
United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975) (relevant scientific evidence should be admitted unless exaggerated popular opin-
ion of the accuracy of the technique will make its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the
jury). See also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 101, 702[03] at 702-17; Note,
Expert Testimony, supra note 103, at 780.
235 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1041.
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lished to have gained general acceptance in the field in which it
belongs.23 8
The Frye test for admissibility, thus, is whether a novel scientific
technique or principle is generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community. 23 9 Under the Frye test, three factors must be deter-
mined: (1) the relevant scientific community; (2) the underlying
principle or technique; and (3) the general acceptance of the under-
lying principle or technique within the relevant scientific commu-
nity. 240  Determining each of these factors is problematic.
Questions arise as to whether the relevant scientific community is
limited to the subspecialty within a field that has "direct and empiri-
cal" experience with the underlying principle or techinique, or
whether a broader group of scientists may be polled to determine
general acceptance. 24 1 How to define the degree of acceptance that
constitutes "general acceptance" is unclear. 24 2 Choosing the princi-
ples or techniques that must be generally accepted may be
difficult.
2 43
Although most courts use the Frye test, 244 the test is criticized
sharply by some commentators 245 and abandoned in favor of other
238 Id.
239 See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980); see also Note, Expert Testimony, supra
note 103, at 775-76.
240 Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1205-15.
241 See People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251(1958); Com-
monwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975)(defining the relevant scien-
tific community as being subspecialty with direct and empirical experience with the
underlying principle and technique); Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1210.
242 Courts have not defined precisely what constitutes general acceptance. "For ex-
ample, one court has defined general acceptance as 'widespread; prevalent; extensive
though not universal.' (quoting United States v. Zeigler, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.
D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Another court has conceded that 'a degree
of scientific divergence of view is inevitable,' without elaborating on how much diver-
gence would be dispositive (quoting Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 204 n.6, 327
N.E.2d at 678 n.6)." Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1211.
243 "It is unresolved whether the Frye standard requires general acceptance of the sci-
entific technique or of both the underlying principle and the technique applying it."
Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1211.
244 The Frye test of" 'general acceptance' in the scientific community has come to be
the standard in almost all of the courts in the country which have considered the ques-
tion of the admissibility of scientific evidence." Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391
A.2d 364, 368 (1978). See also United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1975); Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1205.
245 See, e.g., 1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 821-22 (Frye
test is overly conservative); Giannelli, supra note 239; MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 203
at 491 (general acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of facts but
should not be a criterion for the admissibility of evidence).
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approaches by some courts. 246 An alternative to the Frye general
acceptance standard is a balancing test for admissibility that weighs
the probative value, materiality, and reliability of the scientific evi-
dence against its tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the
jury.247 This balancing test involves essentially the same factors as
the balancing test under Rule 403, discussed previously. 248 The
test focuses on the reliability of the scientific evidence. If the evi-
dence is not reliable, it will have no probative value and will have no
relevance. 249 The counterweight to the probative value of the evi-
dence, as in the Rule 403 balancing test, is the danger of misleading
the jury by the aura of infallibility surrounding scientific evi-
dence.250 Under the balancing approach, several decisions have es-
tablished that it is unnecessary to show the absolute certainty or
246 In State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981), the court explained its reasons for rejecting the Frye test:
(1) Such a rule imposes a standard for admissibility not required of other areas
of expert testimony, McCoRMIcK, supra § 203, at 488-89. (2) It is inconsistent with
modern concepts of evidence, such as embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which provide that '[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue, a
witness may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.' FED. R. EvID.
702. . . . (3) Despite its apparent simplicity, distinguishing 'scientific' evidence
from other areas of expert testimony is a difficult determination in many instances.
MCCORMICK, supra § 203, at 490. The instant case illustrates this difficulty of classi-
fying evidence as scientific or non-scientific. The defendant says the study of blood
flight characteristics is itself a science. The witness, on the other hand, testified it
was based primarily upon physics and mathematics, which impart accuracy and pre-
dictability to the study. (4) 'Acceptance in the scientific community' is a nebulous
concept; as it has been said, 'court records are full of the conflicting opinions of
doctors, engineers and accountants, to name just a few of the legions of expert
witnesses,' United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 994, 91 S. Ct. 1232, 28 L.Ed.2d 531 (1971)(neutron activation analysis evi-
dence admitted), and '[i]n testing for admissibility of a particular type of scientific
evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern may be, the courts cannot in any
event surrender to scientists responsibility for determining the reliability of that
evidence.' United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (spectro-
graphic voice-identification evidence admitted).
1d; see also United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970); cf. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(Frye test applied but criticized for being difficult to apply and for postponing the use of
reliable evidence until general acceptance can be established).
247 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466
(4th Cir. 1975).
248 See supra text accompanying notes 99-152.
249 See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United
States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1384 (S.D. Cal.), aft'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978);
Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1235.
250 Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1237.
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infallibility of the expert's testimony to establish the testimony's
probative value.251 On the opposite side of the balance must be
considered the effectiveness of cross-examination at pointing out
weaknesses in the testimony and the effectiveness of limiting in-
structions at preventing the jury from unjustifiably relying upon or
being mislead by the expert's testimony.252
The courts that have considered the reliability of expert testi-
mony regarding rape trauma syndrome have arrived at varying con-
clusions. These courts, however, have provided little insight into
the standards of reliability and general acceptance they applied, or
the factors they balanced to arrive at their conclusions. The Kansas
Supreme Court in State v. Marks 253 essentially adopted the Frye gen-
eral acceptance test by requiring that rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony be " 'generally accepted as reliable within the expert's
particular scientific field' "254 before receiving it in evidence at trial.
The court concluded that "an examination of the literature clearly
demonstrates that the so-called 'rape trauma syndrome' is generally
accepted to be a common reaction to sexual assault." 255 The opin-
ion does not identify in which field rape trauma syndrome must be
generally accepted as reliable, nor does it specify the exact extent to
which rape trauma syndrome was found to be accepted. The court
did not state whether rape trauma syndrome's reliability as evidence
that a forcible rape took place was generally accepted or whether
only rape trauma syndrome's existence as a common reaction to a
sexual assault was generally accepted.
In an opinion reaching the opposite conclusion, the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected the reliability of rape trauma syndrome as a
scientific test to determine whether a rape has occurred.256 With-
out explicitly adopting either the Frye general acceptance test or a
251 See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
1117 (a scientific technique unable to garner any support would have no probative
value); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975).
252 Giannelli, supra note 239, at 1239-45; Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 103, at 780.
253 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
254 Id. at 654, P.2d at 1299.
255 Id. The court reviewed the following books to verify the general acceptance of
rape trauma syndrome: S. MCCOMBIE, THE RAPE CRISIS INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 124-
26 (1980); COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY §§ 21.1d, 24.15, at 1519, 1804-05
(Kaplan, Freedman & Sadock 3d ed. 1980); C. WARNER, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 145-
49 (1980); A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 35-47 (1979); S.
KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 215-31 (1979); E. HILBERMAN, THE
RAPE VICTIM 36 (1976); A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF CRISIS 37-51
(1974).
256 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30.
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balancing test with reliability as a weighted factor, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not the
type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether
a rape has occurred. The scientific evaluation of rape trauma syn-
drome has not reached a level of reliability that surpasses the quality
of common sense evaluation present in jury deliberations. '" 257
Aside from the facts that the characteristic symptoms of rape trauma
syndrome may follow any psychologically traumatic event and may
or may not appear in a given individual's case, 258 the court provided
no support for its position that expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome will not be admissible until further evidence of the scien-
tific accuracy of syndrome diagnoses can be established. 259 Thus,
these courts have not provided clear rationales for their decisions to
accept or reject the reliability of rape trauma syndrome. Nor have
they provided clear guidelines for testing the reliability of rape
trauma syndrome.
A few courts have adopted positions that create a middle
ground between the Minnesota and Kansas conclusions. These
courts concede that rape trauma syndrome is generally accepted as a
common reaction to rape within the general scientific community
within which the syndrome arose. 260 They conclude, however, that
rape trauma syndrome is generally accepted only as a counseling or
therapeutic tool, not as a reliable method of proving that a rape has
occurred. 261 The California Supreme Court explains that rape
trauma syndrome was developed by professional rape counselors to
"identify, predict and treat emotional problems" rather than to ver-
ify the truth of the alleged victims. 262 These courts, therefore,
reject the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome to prove that a rape occurred. 263
Courts that examine the reliability of rape trauma syndrome
under the Frye general acceptance test or a balancing test may be
misapplying these tests.26 Close scrutiny of expert testimony's reli-
ability is necessary only when the judiciary has not recognized that
257 Id.
258 Id. at 229-30.
259 Id.
260 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,460
(1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Mo. 1984).
261 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249, 251, 681 P.2d at 300, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459,
460; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
262 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
263 The Missouri Supreme Court reached its conclusion by a balancing test. The
court weighed the general acceptance of the reliability of the testimony against its ten-
dency to create undue prejudice. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 239, 240.
264 See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 464-65 n.121.
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the foundation of the testimony is a proper subject for expert testi-
mony. 26 5 The foundation of rape trauma syndrome-clinical psy-
chology-has long been recognized as a proper subject for expert
testimony in criminal trials.266
Moreover, the types of subjects to which the Frye general ac-
ceptance test and the balancing test have been applied support the
conclusion that the tests should not be applied to rape trauma syn-
drome. Polygraph evidence, 267 sound spectrometry, 268 neutron ac-
tivation analysis, 269  atomic absorption,270  and remote
electromagnetic sensing 271 are some of the novel scientific tech-
niques to which these tests are applied. These techniques are intro-
duced to test the truth of a hypothesis through a controlled
experiment involving technological equipment or chemicals. Ex-
perts then testify about the results produced from the experiment.
Jurors typically will have no understanding of the scientific process
that occurs during the experiment and, therefore, will have no basis
for determining whether the results of the experiment are valid, or
whether the expert's conclusions based on the results are justified.
In these situations, a very real danger exists that laymen will be
overly impressed by the accuracy of the expert's conclusions.
The testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome does not
present the same problems for juror evaluation. An expert does not
base testimony about rape trauma syndrome on the results of a mys-
terious experiment. Rather, experts base their testimony on the re-
sults of face-to-face interviews with rape victims. 272 Because no
mysterious testing procedures are involved, jurors can assess the
merits of the testimony on rape trauma syndrome in general and the
merits of the expert's description of the complainant's emotional
and psychological state. In fact, jurors may have an opportunity to
265 See supra text accompanying note 229.
266 See United States v. Bilson, 648 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1981) (psychiatrist permitted
to testify about the results of psychological testing); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc); United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(per curiam); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (1962) (Burger, J., concurring)
("[t]he issue is not now and never was whether a psychologist's testimony is admissible
in litigation where 'sanity' is at issue. Such testimony has long been admissible").
267 United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
268 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(technique involves
comparison of visual images produced by sound recordings).
269 United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
270 Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), rev'd, 348 So. 2d 838
(Ala.), acq., 348 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).
271 United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 70, 144.
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make their own judgments about the complainant through their own
observations at trial.
If courts, nevertheless, decide that a Frye test of general accept-
ance within a scientific field applies to expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome, courts should focus on the general acceptance of
clinical psychology. It is the methods of clinical psychology that are
used to detect the presence of rape trauma syndrome.273 When
considering the admissibility of expert testimony on battered wife
syndrome,274 a District of Columbia court, in Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, recognized that the inquiry of the Frye test should be focused
on the general acceptance of the methodology used rather than the
general acceptance of the subject matter studied.2 75 The court thus
focused on the acceptance of clinical psychology rather than the ac-
ceptance of the battered wife syndrome.
The court in Ibn-Tamas illustrated its interpretation of the Frye
general acceptance requirement by describing the results of the
Hearst cases.2 76 In the first Hearst case, the court admitted psychiat-
ric testimony about the impact of kidnapping and incarceration on
the defendant's later mental state when she allegedly committed a
crime. The expert's qualifications and methodology apparently
were not questioned. In Hearst II, however, the psycholinguistics
methodology was challenged and held by the court to be insuffi-
ciently established to warrant admissibility. These two decisions are
instructive on the kinds of expert testimony that are and are not
admissible and on the proper-and limited-role of the Frye test.2 "7
Though experts may disagree as to the precise components of bat-
tered wife syndrome or as to its actual consequences, the existence
of the syndrome is based on research conducted in accordance with
generally accepted methods of clinical psychology.2 78 The court in
Ibn-Tamas thus ruled that as a matter of law, the methodology used
to identify and define battered wife syndrome-the methodology of
273 See supra text accompanying notes 144, 145.
274 "Battered wife syndrome" describes the pattern of physical and psychological
abuse inflicted upon a woman by her mate. Comment, Expert Testimony on Battered Wife
Syndrome, supra note 88, at 350.
275 "[T]he relevant question here is whether Dr. Walker's [the expert's] methodology
for identifying and studying battered women has such general acceptance-not whether
there is, in addition, a general acceptance of the battered woman concept derived from
that methodology." Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d at 638.
276 United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1976)(Hearst I); United
States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976)(Hearst II).
277 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d at 637-38.
278 The court in Ibn-Tamas determined that the Frye test should be applied to make a
"'state of the art'" inquiry rather than to make an inquiry into the amount of substan-
tive knowledge available. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d at 638.
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clinical psychology-met the requirements of general acceptance. 279
Likewise, the existence of rape trauma syndrome is based on
research conducted in accordance with generally accepted methods
of clinical psychology. 280 Like battered wife syndrome, rape trauma
syndrome describes and explains victim behavior. Unlike testimony
based on novel scientific techniques, battered wife syndrome and
rape trauma syndrome testimony do not require the jury to evaluate
conclusions without being able to understand the scientific under-
pinnings of the conclusions. Jurors can understand the physical
processes these experts use to arrive at the conclusions.
Even if a Frye general acceptance test is applied to rape trauma
syndrome rather than to clinical psychology, the results of such a
test should favor the admission of the testimony. Courts allow gen-
eral acceptance to be established through expert testimony, scien-
tific and legal writings, and judicial opinions. 28 1 There appears to
be no dispute in the fields of clinical psychology, psychiatry,
medicine, and rape counselling that rape can have traumatic emo-
tional and psychological impacts on victims. 282 There also seems to
be no dispute that victims' reactions fall into patterns and that these
patterns include a wide range of victim responses. 283 In fact, the
variety of victim responses and the fact that not all victims will expe-
rience the same reactions are well-documented features of rape
trauma syndrome.28 4 The mental health field thus has generally ac-
cepted the premises underlying rape trauma syndrome testimony-
that rape can have traumatic emotional and psychological conse-
quences, that these consequences are observable, and that patterns
of behavior are identifiable. Judicial opinions also have recognized
consistently the existence of a rape trauma syndrome.28 5 Because
there does not appear to be any disagreement as to the existence of
rape trauma syndrome, it is unnecessary to consider which particu-
lar subgroup of mental health professionals must agree upon its
existence or what level of acceptance constitutes general
acceptance.
279 Id. at 638-39.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 144, 145.
281 State v. Cavallo, 88 NJ. 508, 521, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982); Giannelli, supra
note 239, at 1215.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 23-53.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 23-53.
285 See, e.g., State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982); White v. Violent
Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368, 387-88, 388 A.2d 206, 216 (1978); In the
Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 38-43, 428 A.2d 126, 138-40
(1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting);
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A balancing test for admissibility also should allow rape trauma
syndrome testimony to be admitted. The discussion of Rule 403
involved the same balancing test, assuming the existence of the tes-
timony's reliability.28 6 Although several standards are used to mea-
sure reliability, 28 7 reliability may be established at trial by
demonstrating general acceptance within the scientific commu-
nity,2 8 8 or by producing experts to testify about the testimony's reli-
ability.28 9 The level of reliability that must be demonstrated also
varies, 290 but some minimal level of support must be established.29'
Evidence unable to garner any support from the scientific commu-
nity will be inadmissible. 292 As discussed previously, a strong show-
ing can be made that there is general acceptance of rape trauma
syndrome among mental health professionals and that it receives
extensive support among mental health professionals and the judici-
ary. The use of clinical psychology methodology to observe and de-
scribe human behavior also receives extensive support among
mental health professionals. 293 Reliability, therefore, can be estab-
lished; the previous balance in favor of admitting rape trauma syn-
drome testimony need not be disturbed.
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome thus satisfies the
three-part admissibility requirement of Rule 702. Rape trauma syn-
drome testimony meets the helpfulness requirement because the
testimony describes accurately the highly relevant emotional, behav-
ioral, and psychological reaction of the complainant to the alleged
rape; it also educates jurors about reactions of rape victims. The
testimony fulfills the reliability requirement because both rape
trauma syndrome and clinical psychology withstand scrutiny under
the general acceptance test of Frye or the balancing test. And the
third requirement, that of a qualified expert, can be fulfilled by a
286 See supra text accompanying notes 99-153.
287 See Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 103, at 786.
288 See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1979); United States v.
Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States
v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
289 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 389, at 662 (1979).
290 State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 983 (La. 1979)(evidence must be as reliable as
other admissible evidence); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978)(evidence
must have sufficient reliability to make it relevant); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 501, 391
A.2d 364, 427 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting) (evidence admissible if some degree of relia-
bility shown, or if not totally unreliable).
291 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979).
292 Id.
293 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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physician, psychologist, or counselor who has the requisite experi-
ence working with rape victims.
III. CONCLUSION
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome should be admissi-
ble in rape trials where the complainant's consent is at issue. The
testimony provides highly relevant information on the complain-
ant's emotional state following the alleged rape. The experts
providing information can be trained and experienced observers of
post-rape emotional and psychological states and, therefore, are
eminently qualified to assist jurors in understanding the significance
of a rape complainant's emotional and psychological state. Any
danger of prejudice to the defendant from the admission of such
testimony can be minimized by insisting that the experts are prop-
erly qualified, effective cross-examination, and appropriate limiting
instructions.
HELEN J. LAUDERDALE
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